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DISABILITY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Michael E. Waterstone∗
ABSTRACT
As a result of fierce advocacy, people with disabilities have been uniquely
successful in securing federal legislation protecting them from discrimination
in all areas of life. The modern disability rights movement is engaged in a
constant struggle to enforce these rights, both in and out of the courts. There
has been little attention to directly using the Constitution to protect the rights
of people with disabilities. In a recent project, I interviewed many of the key
leaders of the disability rights movement, who confirmed that while they would
like to devote more attention to constitutional issues, there is no current shortor long-term constitutional strategy. Rather, these lawyers take the Supreme
Court’s decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., holding
that people with disabilities are only entitled to rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause, as a given. Their attention has turned elsewhere.
This deconstitutionalization has costs. State laws still facially discriminate
against people with disabilities, often people with mental disabilities, in areas
like family law, voting, commitment proceedings, and the provision of benefits
and licenses. Federal legislation is an incomplete tool to challenge the
exclusions these laws create. Progressive theorizing of constitutional law is
happening, just not regarding disability. Although functionally justifiable, this
reluctance to pursue constitutional claims impoverishes the disability rights
movement, as constitutional claims engage courts in articulating our core
values in a way that statutory claims do not. Disability law can and should do
more to fulfill the Constitution’s guarantees of equal protection and full
citizenship. In this Article, I explore what a more progressive future for
disability constitutional law might look like. Building on gains by the LGBT
movement, I offer specific areas where courts should entertain a more
contextualized application of the Equal Protection Clause in disability cases.
∗ J. Howard Ziemann Fellow and Professor of Law, Associate Dean of Research and Academic Centers,
Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Thanks to Doug NeJaime, Justin Levitt, Mark Weber, Robert Dinerstein,
Ruth Colker, Jennifer Mathis, and Sam Bagenstos for reviewing drafts and helpful conversations. I dedicate
this Article to the memory of my dear friend, co-author, and mentor, Charles Siegal. He never stopped working
to make the world a more just one for people with disabilities.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern disability law is primarily a statutory field. The main relevance of
constitutional law is to provide the basis for congressional legislation, either
through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Spending Clause, or the
Commerce Clause. Although historically disability advocates pursued
constitutional theories to reform institutions and achieve access to schools,
today the key tool for disability rights is litigation under federal statutes. By
and large, this strategy has been successful: the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) addresses discrimination in employment, government programs
and services, and access to privately owned places of public accommodation.1
The Fair Housing Act covers discrimination in housing,2 and the Individuals
with Disabilities in Education Act provides a right to education for school-age
children with disabilities.3
This Article takes up the issue of whether, given the preeminence of a
statutory strategy, there is any future for disability constitutional law. The
largest constitutional “moment” for disability law was the Supreme Court’s
decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.4 There, while
ultimately striking down a zoning ordinance as infringing the Equal Protection
rights of individuals with mental retardation, the Court held that the disability
classification was only entitled to rational basis scrutiny.5 In other state and
federal constitutional contexts, Cleburne has been applied to achieve a more
nuanced Equal Protection review of discriminatory state action.6 But not with
disability, where subsequent cases have confirmed only Cleburne’s most
restrictive aspects.7 Constitutional law has evolved, but it has stayed frozen in
time for people with disabilities.
Disability advocacy has of course continued, but has been primarily
focused on legislative reform, culminating with the ADA, and litigation
enforcing these statutory rights. In a previous project, I interviewed many of
the nation’s leading disability rights lawyers, who all confirmed that there is
currently no short- or long-term vision to challenge Cleburne, either as decided

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012).
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.
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in or as applied in subsequent cases, or to mine its positive implications.8
Correspondingly, almost all recent forward-looking disability scholarship has
either helped provide a theoretical foundation for or analyzed statutory or other
types of policy reform, with sparse discussion of disability constitutional law.9
Viewing disability advocacy in relation to the course charted by LGBT
advocates highlights the deconstitutionalization of modern disability law. The
year after Cleburne was decided, the LGBT community suffered a loss in the
Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld Georgia’s sodomy law as
not violating the constitutional rights of homosexuals.10 In the aftermath of
Bowers, LGBT advocates pivoted to state constitutional law, challenging
sodomy statutes in state court.11 This shift influenced federal constitutional
norms and helped pave the way for the Supreme Court’s ultimate overturning
of Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas12 and the Court’s recent decision in United
States v. Windsor, holding that section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act was
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.13 Similarly, in the (thus far
unsuccessful) attempts to pass the Employment Nondiscrimination Act, which
would extend employment antidiscrimination law to the LGBT classification,
advocates carefully developed and presented Congress with support for the
proposition that LGBT individuals were entitled to heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause.14 At nearly the same time Congress heard
testimony on the Employment Nondiscrimination Act, disability advocates
were engaged in passing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,15 which, amongst
8 See Michael E. Waterstone, Michael Ashley Stein & David B. Wilkins, Disability Cause Lawyers, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1287, 1318 (2012) (noting the views of one lawyer, who stated “I live in an age when
Federal courts are not going to interpret the Federal Constitution in ways that are going to assist me, and so
unless I have a case that absolutely screams out for it, I’m not going to be looking for novel constitutional
theories because all I’m likely to accomplish in doing that is to create a precedent that will foreclose those who
come after me in what I hope will be a warmer judicial climate.”); see also infra notes 172–73.
9 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004) (focusing on
future reform under the antidiscrimination and welfare models); Eve Hill & Peter Blanck, Future of Disability
Rights Advocacy and “The Right to Live in the World,” 15 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2009) (discussing the wideranging future of disability litigation without discussion of constitutional advocacy).
10 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
11 See infra Part II.B.
12 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
14 See H.R. 3017, Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ.
& Labor, 111th Cong. 46 (2010) (prepared statement of William Eskridge, Jr., John A. Garver Professor of
Jurisprudence, Yale Law School), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/
Eskridge.pdf (original link to prepared statement provided in the hearing record no longer in service).
15 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (Supp. V 2011)).

WATERSTONE GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

1/31/2014 12:41 PM

DISABILITY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

531

other things, removed the primary provision in the original ADA noting
Congress’s view that people with disabilities were entitled to heightened
protection under the Equal Protection Clause.16
The LGBT and disability causes are of course different, operating in
different political and legal spaces. What is good for the goose is not
necessarily good for the gander. But the divergence of these two groups does
present a stark contrast: LGBT advocates purposefully pursued change with
the ultimate goal of having at least some constitutional reform on their agenda;
disability advocates have not.17 Given the success of a legislative strategy and
the hostility of the current Supreme Court to expand the Equal Protection
Clause, this move is certainly defensible. And the significant canon of
disability law scholarship has mined many complex statutory and regulatory
issues. This Article breaks new ground by suggesting that such a complete
move away from constitutional law has costs and that the exclusion of the
Constitution from disability advocacy is not inevitable.
As interpreted in disability cases, Cleburne has limited Congress’s ability
to legislate on behalf of people with disabilities. These challenges are likely to
continue. And some segments of the disability community—specifically,
individuals with mental disabilities—have been more at the fringes of statutory
disability advocacy, and had a harder time translating legislative successes into
the promises of full citizenship.18 There are still areas where Cleburne, and its
cramped vision of disability constitutional law, is used to sanction state action
which operates to the exclusion of these groups.19 Progressive theorizing about
the Constitution is already happening, but these efforts thus far have not
included disability-specific thinking.20 Courts are actors in our evolving
constitutional dialogue, but the conversation has been stilted regarding
disability. Despite having much to offer in important discussions about stigma,
animus, and exclusion, disability advocates have not been an active part of
articulating these constitutional values. The result is that despite a nominal
victory in Cleburne, its application has not lived up to its promise and
potential, which the LGBT community has helped realize. Constitutional law is
at least in part about recognizing past injustices and current prejudice against
groups, but it is not being used at all in this way for people with disabilities.
16
17
18
19
20

See infra notes 105–12 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
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We should expect more from constitutional law on disability, and disability has
more to offer constitutional law than is currently being realized.
Any arguments about disability constitutional law must be located within
the context of modern disability rights advocacy. Thus, I seek to place this
project within the growing body of scholarship demonstrating the crucial link
between social movements and evolving notions of constitutional law.21
Disability constitutional law will not casually develop; it will only happen
when movement lawyers make a conscious decision to invest resources and
manage the requisite legal risk. They have good reason to be a skeptical
audience: part of what I and others have shown in previous work is that
disability cause lawyers are quite pragmatic, and intensely focused on pursuing
access to employment opportunities, government programs, and privately
owned places of public accommodation, not abstract pronouncements of
constitutional rights.22 At the same time, a move toward the courts to declare
new constitutional rights has moved out of vogue amongst progressive legal
commentators, partially based on the perceived futility of litigating these cases
in a conservative judicial era23 and also in recognition of the “hollow hope”
provided by Court victories.24
Despite this, operating within the practical nature of a highly evolved
disability advocacy movement, and incorporating the literature on dynamic
constitutionalism, this Article offers an optimistic (and hopefully realistic)
assessment of what constitutional law could actually accomplish for people

21 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
427, 427 (2007) (arguing “that a key element of constitutional interpretation is our attitude of attachment to the
constitutional project and our beliefs about its ultimate trajectory”); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–68 (2001) (arguing that political
appointments to the Court “best account [for] how the meaning of the Constitution changes over time through
Article III interpretation rather than through Article V amendment”); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Essay,
Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006) (arguing that political
contestation can alter what people think constitutional principles mean and how principles should apply in
practice).
22 See generally Michael Ashley Stein, Michael E. Waterstone & David B. Wilkins, Cause Lawyering for
People with Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658 (2010) (reviewing SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009)); see generally also Waterstone et al., supra
note 8, at 1318.
23 See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 218 (1994) (“It is not at all clear, from a
progressive political point of view, that the development of a progressive constitutional paradigm—to which a
conservative Court will be openly hostile—is a worthwhile project.”).
24 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991) (discussing the tension between courts’ need to act in the face of injustice and the actual
social change effected by those decisions).
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with disabilities. LGBT advocates have been successful in securing favorable
decisions in lower courts, and most recently in the Supreme Court, in
challenges to discriminatory marriage laws. In hindsight, it is easy to examine
how this political and judicial strategy has been successful. And while Windsor
was not a complete victory for the LGBT movement in the pursuit of marriage
equality, and predictably did not result in a constitutional renaissance of new
protected classes, this decision and the lower court cases leading up to it did
create space in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.25 Disability cause
lawyers should pay careful heed, looking to adopt similar strategies as they are
able.
I argue that, prompted by advocates, courts should adopt a more
contextualized Equal Protection review for state laws that facially discriminate
against people with disabilities (most often, people with mental disabilities). A
contextualized review would acknowledge the history of prejudice and
segregation against people with disabilities, as well as recognize the important
ways that state classifications operate to their detriment. Too often, Cleburne is
cited in disability cases for the simple holding that people with disabilities are
not entitled to heightened scrutiny and that any state justification for
discriminatory laws is constitutionally permissible. To challenge this simplistic
application, advocates should consider more of a resource investment in state
and federal court strategies that have proven successful with other groups.
Even taking a long-term view, a move to argue for a different vision of
Cleburne will not be uncontroversial or easily adopted. People with disabilities
have achieved legislative success by joining separate communities with very
different disabilities to gather requisite political support, uniting under the
theory of the “social model” of disability to achieve pan-disability solutions.26
In contrast, targeted constitutional strategies would likely only benefit certain
communities. This approach will not be universally popular, but in my
estimation, it is warranted. Applying Cleburne in disability law cases as it has
been applied elsewhere corrects its primary error of refusing to acknowledge
the role of stigma and prejudice against people with disabilities, and assuming
that disability classifications are based on benevolent attitudes instead of being
reflective of a history of discrimination.

25

See infra Part III.A.
The social model of disability posits that disability is a socially constructed category created by the
combination of an individual’s impairments and society’s response to those impairments. See SAMUEL R.
BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 18 (2009).
26
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly traces the role of
constitutional law in disability advocacy, starting with the right to treatment
and education for children with disabilities movements, where constitutional
law played an active role. It then discusses Cleburne and its subsequent
extension by Court precedents, moving to the current statutory model of
disability law. Part II takes on the question of why discussing disability
constitutional law is worthwhile, given both the limited prospects of short-term
success in the federal courts as well as the current robustness of the legislative
model. Building on the idea that a long-term strategy to rehabilitate Cleburne
is a worthwhile project, Part III suggests some steps that advocates should
consider taking as a way to begin the process anew of framing the rights of
people with disabilities in constitutional terms.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PAST AND PRESENT OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT
A. Constitutional History
Like other social movements, the disability rights movement engaged in
systemic constitutional litigation to accomplish some of its early objectives.
The right to appropriate treatment, so important in early efforts to reform
deplorable institutions,27 was grounded in the Due Process Clause.28 The
recognition of this right spawned a wave of litigation to determine and give
force to the contours of this right.29 Similarly, special education law and
27 For a complete history of the right to treatment and deinstitutionalization movements, see MICHAEL L.
PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY 166–90 (1994).
28 The ideological foundations of this right are generally credited to Morton Birnbaum, who advocated
“the recognition and enforcement of the legal right of a mentally ill inmate of a public mental institution to
adequate medical treatment for his mental illness.” Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J.
499, 499 (1960). Birnbaum drew inspiration from Justice Frankfurter’s discussion of the Due Process Clause
in Solesbee v. Balkcom, where Justice Frankfurter wrote, “the Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history.” Id. at 503 (quoting Solesbee v.
Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Birnbaum hoped that, if the right to treatment
were recognized, “our substantive constitutional law would then include the concept[] that . . . substantive due
process of law does not allow a mentally ill person who has committed no crime to be deprived of his liberty
by indefinitely institutionalizing him in a mental prison.” Id. The constitutional right to treatment would
eventually come to fruition in the landmark case of Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971)
(finding patients “unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give
each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition”), aff’d sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). This right was substantially affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
29 See PERLIN, supra note 27, at 182–90.
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advocacy had its roots in Brown v. Board of Education, where the Supreme
Court found that, although there is no constitutional right to education, “where
the state has undertaken to provide it, [public education] is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms.”30 “[C]oincident with the independent
living movement, courts in Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia issued
landmark decisions requiring [the] education and integration of students with
disabilities in public education.”31 In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, the court approved a consent decree providing that,
having undertaken to provide a free public education, Pennsylvania must
educate all children, including those with disabilities.32 And in Mills v. Board
of Education, the court held that the Equal Protection Clause required inclusion
of children with disabilities in public education.33
These were not just constitutional movements. They were based on
multiple forms of advocacy at all levels of government.34 And from early
legislative schemes focused on rehabilitation and benefits35 to later laws taking
30

347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 942 (2d ed. 2009) (“While this decision did not involve children with
disabilities, its finding that segregation in education based solely on race was inherently unequal formed the
basis for disability advocates to argue that unnecessary segregation or exclusion of children with disabilities
was similarly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.”); Daniel
H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 606 (1995)
(discussing disability rights advocates’ reliance on Brown).
31 BLANCK ET AL., supra note 30, at 942.
32 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258, 1260 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (parties stipulating in consent decree that “placement
in a regular public school class is preferable to placement in a special public school class and placement in a
special public school class is preferable to placement in any other type of program of education and training”);
see also Melvin, supra note 30, at 607 (explaining that in a subsequent ruling upholding the consent decree,
the court “[c]redit[ed] expert testimony that mentally retarded children can benefit from education and
training . . . [and] decided that there was no rational basis for the school districts’ complete denial of an
educational opportunity to mentally retarded children” (citing Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1972))). Upholding the consent decree, the court applied
Brown, finding that the plaintiffs had raised a “colorable claim” that the exclusion of mentally disabled
children from the classrooms lacked a rational basis. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. at 297.
33 348 F. Supp. 866, 874–76 (D.D.C. 1972). Mills also held that the additional cost of such education was
not a defense. Id. at 876 (“If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that
are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner
that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with his needs and ability to
benefit therefrom.”).
34 See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 27, at 169 (discussing congressional hearings and state legislation); see
also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7
(2012) (“[Deinstitutionalization] campaigns were fought, among other places, in state legislatures, state
executive branches, and the federal courts.”).
35 See, e.g., Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 511–515, 49 Stat. 620, 631–33, amended by
Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2191–2194, 95 Stat. 357, 818–30
(1981) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701–713 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)) (establishing federal funding
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more of a civil rights approach,36 a constitutional approach always worked
along with a statutory one. But constitutional recognition and enforcement of
rights under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses were integral
parts of these campaigns, although not all results were positive.37
B. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
The status of people with disabilities under the Equal Protection Clause
was most clearly considered by the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.38 There, a company seeking to open a group
home for individuals with mental retardation challenged a city zoning
ordinance that excluded group homes for people with mental retardation.39 The
Fifth Circuit held that mental retardation is a “quasi-suspect” classification and
that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it did not
substantially further an important governmental purpose.40 Justice White,
writing for the majority, first explained why heightened scrutiny was
appropriate for classifications based on race, alienage, national origin,41 and
gender,42 but not for age.43 Framing the issue, the Court wrote,

for state systems of health services for “crippled” children); Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 219, 41 Stat.
735 (1920) (providing vocational rehabilitation to individuals “disabled in industry or in any legitimate
occupation”), repealed and replaced by Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796l (2012)).
36 See, e.g., Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012)) (ensuring children with disabilities access in the
public school system); Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat.
1678 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee to 1973ee-6 (2006)) (ensuring polling places for federal
elections are accessible to voters with disabilities); Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82
Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–4156 (2006)) (requiring new facilities built with federal
funds be accessible to people with disabilities).
37 See infra notes 72–81 and accompanying text.
38 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
39 Id. at 435–37.
40 Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
41 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“[Race, alienage, and national origin] are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.”).
42 Id. at 441 (“Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and
burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of
men and women.”).
43 Id. (“While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination, such
persons . . . have not experienced a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’ or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.” (quoting Mass. Bd.
of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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[W]here individuals in the group affected by a law have
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the
authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they
should be in our federal system and with our respect for the
separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to
44
whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued.

Turning to how to characterize people with mental retardation under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court made several findings. It reasoned that
people with mental retardation “have a reduced ability to cope with and
function in the everyday world,” that they are not “all cut from the same
pattern,” and that “[t]hey are thus different, immutably so.”45 Essentially, the
Court reasoned that the state’s interest in providing for and caring for people
with mental retardation is a legitimate one, and the legislature is better suited
to make what will be difficult determinations than the judiciary.46 Infused in
the Court’s opinion is a pitying notion, so rejected by the modern disability
rights movement,47 that “one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by
something he or she can’t do anything about,”48 and that legislators would and
had appropriately responded with remedial legislation intended to help this
group.49 It also viewed this legislative response as belying any claims of
44

Id. at 441–42.
Id. at 442.
46 Id. at 442–43 (“How this large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and
often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the
perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary.”).
47 See, e.g., JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 41–73, 105–41 (1993) (documenting how those with disabilities have been able to succeed in life
by using their perceived disability to their advantage in conducting disability activism and have otherwise
maintained successful careers).
48 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 n.10 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980)).
49 Id. at 443–44 (“[T]he distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the plight of those
who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but also that the lawmakers
have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a
corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary.”). The Court discussed the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012)) (outlawing discrimination against people with mental retardation in
federally funded programs); the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 98527, sec. 201, § 111(1), (2), 89 Stat. 486, 502 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6009(1)–(2) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)) (repealed 2000) (providing a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation); the
Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(5)(B) (1982)) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012)) (making federal education funding
contingent on states integrating children with mental retardation into schools); and the Mentally Retarded
Persons Act of 1977 § 7, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300, § 7 (West Supp. 1985) (current version at
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 592.013 (West 2010)) (providing people with mental retardation the
right to living in the least restrictive setting appropriate to their individual needs).
45
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political powerlessness.50 Finally, the Court was concerned about the
coherency of future lawmaking if it elevated the scrutiny of people with mental
retardation.51 Elevated scrutiny was therefore not appropriate.52
Many aspects of this holding are questionable. Justice Marshall’s powerful
concurrence and dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, challenged
some of the majority’s assumptions.53 The Court made a somewhat casual
assertion that while racial minorities and women are all monolithic for
purposes of state classifications, people with mental retardation are not “cut
from the same pattern.”54 But all groups are different in a way that can impact
their relations with the state;55 the relevant inquiry should be whether
permissible distinctions drawn by states between persons bear the requisite
relationship to their relevant characteristics.56 As Justice Marshall wrote,
If the Court’s . . . principle were sound, heightened scrutiny
would have to await a day when people could be cut from a cookie
mold. . . . [T]hat some retarded people have reduced capacities in
some areas does not justify using retardation as a proxy for reduced
capacity in areas where relevant individual variations in capacity do
57
exist.

The Court also downplayed the “‘lengthy and tragic history’ of segregation and
discrimination” faced by those with mental disabilities “that can only be called
grotesque.”58 Far from the few benign laws the majority relied on, there is an
unmentioned history of segregation, discrimination, eugenics, forced
sterilization, and denial of rights of citizenship to those with mental

50

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445.
Id. at 445–46 (“[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasisuspect . . . , it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have
perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired
legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One
need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to
set out on that course, and we decline to do so.”).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 455–78 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
54 Id. at 442 (majority opinion).
55 In the LGBT context, for example, the burdens of same-sex marriage bans fall differently on gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals. See, e.g., Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from
Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415 (2012) (arguing that bisexuals are uniquely situated in the same-sex
marriage debate).
56 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 468 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 461 (citation omitted) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 303 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
51
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disabilities.59 Through this lens, Justice Marshall viewed remedial legislation
not as evidence of political power, but rather an evolution of cultural, political,
and social patterns that will naturally come to be embodied in legislation.60 But
he argued that it was not a faithful application of the Court’s equal protection
principles to characterize such progress as prohibiting heightened scrutiny.61
The Court was also willing to acknowledge that “statutes distributing benefits
and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women,”62 while seemingly
ignoring that legislators might have dated and stereotypical assumptions of the
capabilities of people with disabilities. This belies reality.63
Even under rational basis review, the Court ultimately struck down the
zoning ordinance in Cleburne. The Court rejected the justifications offered by
the City for the law, including the negative attitude of adjoining property
owners, the home’s proximity to a school, and the size of the home and the
number of people that would occupy it, as not rational and resting “on an

59 Id. at 461–64; see also, e.g., STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 18
(1983) (describing historical mistreatment and imprisonment of those with mental disabilities); J. H.
LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION 302–03 (1932) (documenting state laws allowing human sterilization). The
right to enforce forcible sterilization laws was upheld by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927).
60 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“It
is natural that evolving standards of equality come to be embodied in legislation. When that occurs, courts
should look to the fact of such change as a source of guidance on evolving principles of equality.”).
61 Id. at 467 (“[E]ven when judicial action has catalyzed legislative change, that change certainly does
not eviscerate the underlying constitutional principle. The Court, for example, has never suggested that racebased classification became any less suspect once extensive legislation had been enacted on the subject.”).
62 Id. at 441 (majority opinion).
63 When Congress originally passed the ADA, it included a finding that “individuals with disabilities are
a discrete and insular minority who have been . . . relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006) (repealed 2008). This section was removed from the ADA with the
passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, sec. 3, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (Supp. V 2011)), as discussed infra notes 105–12 and accompanying text. See also
Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the
Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
81, 112, 114–23 (2001) (canvassing empirical proof gathered by Congress demonstrating political
powerlessness of people with disabilities, and demonstrating that laws designed to protect those with
disabilities have been interpreted in ways that have in fact furthered stereotypes regarding those with mental
disabilities); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution
of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1993) (arguing
that disability laws crafted by Congress are defective because legislators view those with disabilities as
inherently inferior).
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irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”64 Justice Marshall argued
that this was a striking departure from traditional rational basis review,
characterizing it as something more akin to “second order” rational basis
review.65 In the wake of Cleburne, commentators agreed with this assessment,
noting that despite purporting to apply rational basis scrutiny in Cleburne, the
Court actually applied a heightened form of rational basis scrutiny,66 often
referred to as “rational basis with teeth.”67
According to Justice Marshall, the Equal Protection Clause should involve
more than three rigid tiers of analysis: “I have long believed the level of
scrutiny employed in an equal protection case should vary with ‘the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification
is drawn.’”68 An attendant part of this contextualization was Marshall’s more
expansive view of history and stigma.69 He also declined to link remedial
legislation to requisite political power so as not to need heightened protection
under the Equal Protection Clause.70 Below, in Part III, I demonstrate that
these are all themes that have been effective in subsequent cases, particularly
in LGBT litigation, where state and federal courts have been willing to engage
in more nuanced review of discriminatory state classifications. But generally,
as shown in Part II, these principles have not been extended to constitutional
claims on behalf of people with disabilities. In this context, Cleburne is usually
cited for the simplistic assertion that people with disabilities are not entitled to

64

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448–50.
Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“[T]he Court’s heightened-scrutiny discussion is even more puzzling given that Cleburne’s
ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated with
heightened scrutiny.”).
66 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 804 (4th ed. 2011) (“It
can be argued that the Court’s review was more rigorous than usual for rational basis analysis. Under
traditional rational basis review significant underinclusiveness is tolerated and the government may proceed
one step at a time.”).
67 E.g., Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the
Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 488 n.5 (1998) (“Legislation has also been struck down
on rational review, leading some commentators to believe that a fourth tier of review—the so called ‘rational
basis with teeth’ standard—has been created.” (internal citations omitted)); David O. Stewart, Supreme Court
Report: A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at 108, 112.
68 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
69 See id. at 456, 461.
70 See id. at 465–66.
65
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heightened scrutiny. Unlike Cleburne itself, the classification is then upheld as
valid.71
The Cleburne Court’s analysis, and its extension to all people with
disabilities as discussed below, created and perpetuated a harmful
constitutional “otherness” to the disability classification. In writing that people
with mental retardation have a “reduced ability to cope with and function in the
everyday world,”72 that “[t]hey are . . . different, immutably so,”73 and that
“legislation . . . singling out the retarded for special treatment reflects the real
and undeniable differences between the retarded and others,”74 Justice White’s
majority opinion “took mentally retarded people to be a class of naturally
inferior people.”75 This viewpoint has been criticized as objectionable for
assuming that society is made up of normal and abnormal people, and that
people with mental retardation (as abnormal) are more like each other than the
rest of the community.76 It presumes too easily a causal relationship between
difference and impairment, without adequately addressing how social prejudice
exacerbates disability,77 how new educational or medical techniques can
change how it is experienced,78 or that some difference associated with
disability is not disability specific at all, but behavior (like, Cleburne’s terms,
“reduced ability to cope and function in the everyday world”),79 which could
easily be attributed to larger categories of people (like “absent-minded
professors, improvident artists, and unworldly religieuses”).80 Unfortunately,
this rests uncomfortably close to the Supreme Court’s other main constitutional
pronouncement on disability⎯Buck v. Bell⎯where, in upholding the ability of
states to forcibly sterilize people with mental disabilities, the Court noted that
“[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”81 Despite the ADA’s attempt to

71

See infra Part II.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (majority opinion).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 444.
75 See Silvers & Stein, supra note 63, at 105.
76 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW
105–06 (1990).
77 See Silvers & Stein, supra note 63, at 114 (“In many instances, [repercussions of disability] are
mitigated or thoroughly relieved when the social environment accommodates physical and cognitive
difference.”).
78 See id. at 107 (“[N]ew educational techniques defeat claims about the immutability of some retarded
people’s limitations.”).
79 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
80 Silvers & Stein, supra note 63, at 106–07.
81 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
72
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alter the legal construction of disability, constitutionally, the distinctions
Cleburne created have remained.
C. Cleburne’s Aftermath, Federalism Decisions, and the Constitutional
Foundations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Cleburne left some open questions. The first was whether traditional
rational basis applied to people with disabilities, or whether they would receive
some heightened form of review.82 Two years after Cleburne, the Tenth Circuit
applied some variant of “second order” rational basis scrutiny for reviewing
the exclusion of people with mental and developmental disabilities from a
federally funded housing project.83 But most doubt was resolved with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Heller v. Doe, where the Court used traditional
rational basis scrutiny to analyze the statutory scheme governing involuntary
commitment of mentally disabled persons to state institutions.84 The Heller
majority disclaimed ever “purport[ing] to apply a different standard of rationalbasis review” to cases involving people with mental retardation.85 Justice
Souter dissented that “[w]hile the Court cites Cleburne once, and does not
purport to overrule it, neither does the Court apply it, and at the end of the day
Cleburne’s status is left uncertain.”86 Justice Stevens later wrote that, after
Heller, review of legislative distinctions under rational basis review once again
became “tantamount to no review at all.”87
The second open question was how broadly Cleburne applied to the diverse
universe of people with disabilities. The Cleburne Court itself (and Heller
Court after it) never purported to analyze the equal protection status of
anything beyond people with mental retardation.88 Board of Trustees of the

82

See supra notes 66 and 67.
See Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1354–55 (10th Cir. 1987). Some lower
courts did the same. See Burstyn v. City of Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528, 533 (S.D. Fla. 1987); see also
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 417, 422, 425 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated as moot, 888
F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1989); Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 988–91 (D. Kan. 1985).
84 509 U.S. 312, 314, 319–21 (1993).
85 Id. at 321.
86 Id. at 337 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 323 n.3 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
88 Even within this category, Cleburne has been justifiably criticized for the overinclusiveness of the way
it applied the Equal Protection Clause to the diverse category of people with mental retardation. See Silvers &
Stein, supra note 63, at 106 (noting that, based on the Cleburne record, ninety percent of the individuals falling
into the court’s classification of “persons with mental retardation” were only mildly retarded). This analytical
error was only compounded when Cleburne’s equal protection classification was extended to the more general
category of “people with disabilities.” See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
83
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University of Alabama v. Garrett involved a challenge to the constitutionality
of Title I of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability
in employment.89 The Court ultimately held that Congress did not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity, and thus Title I was unconstitutional
insofar as lawsuits for damages were brought against states.90 In evaluating the
constitutional bases for congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity,
the Court cited Cleburne for the proposition that “[s]tates are not required by
the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled,
so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.”91 Apart from
refusing to acknowledge any form of more contextualized review in Cleburne,
without explanation or elaboration, the Court moved from Cleburne’s holding
on mental retardation to the more general category of “the disabled.”92 The
lack of any reasoning or coherence to this casual expansion was not noted
anywhere in the opinion, not even in Justice Breyer’s powerful dissent.93
Previously, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court had struck down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, holding that Congress could only use its
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide remedies for
constitutional rights recognized by the Courts.94 In City of Boerne, the Court
announced a new standard whereby it would evaluate legislation passed
pursuant to Congress’s Section 5 powers to determine if it was “congruent and
proportional” to the constitutional wrong to be prevented.95 This “new
federalism”96 raised the constitutional stakes, and meant Garrett more squarely
questioned the ability of Congress to pass remedial legislation using its
Section 5 powers. Once the Court took Cleburne to mean that government
classifications on the basis of disability were only entitled to rational basis
review, to meet congruence and proportionality, the question was framed as
whether Congress, before passing the ADA, found a pattern of states
89

531 U.S. 356 (2001).
See id. at 374.
91 Id. at 367.
92 Perhaps the unstated assertion was that if people with mental retardation were not entitled to
heightened scrutiny, no other category of people with disabilities conceivably could be. But there is no
discussion of this in the opinion.
93 Id. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, in his dissent, Justice Breyer does broadly discuss statesponsored discrimination against wide ranges of people with disabilities. Id. at 378.
94 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997).
95 Id. at 530; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act was not a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment).
96 For a more thorough review, see Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56
ALA. L. REV. 793 (2005).
90
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irrationally discriminating against people with disabilities in employment.97
The Court held that Congress did not.98
The next challenge to Congress’s constitutional ability to support the ADA
under Section 5 came in Tennessee v. Lane, which arose under Title II of the
ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in state and
local government programs, services, and activities.99 While affirming the
central holding of Garrett that “classifications based on disability violate that
constitutional command [of congruence and proportionality] if they lack a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose,”100 the Court held
that Title II did validly abrogate state sovereign immunity insofar as it sought
to protect access to the justice system.101 This was based on the fundamental
nature of the access to justice right,102 not on any heightened scrutiny for
disability classifications. Similarly, in United States v. Georgia, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of Title II insofar as it related to enforcing the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.103 So the
lasting impact of Cleburne in these cases has been to enforce a limited view of
Cleburne as only requiring rational basis scrutiny for disability classifications.
This impacts Congress’s ability to pass remedial legislation. Federalism
challenges to the ADA have continued.104
When Congress originally passed the ADA, it was clear that it was using
all of its constitutional powers. This manifested in two provisions: most
expressly, where Congress stated that it was invoking “the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of

97

See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
Id.
99 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004).
100 Id. at 522.
101 See id. at 533–34.
102 Id. at 533.
103 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006).
104 Compare Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1107, 1125 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that Title II of the
ADA did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in the realm of professional licensing), and Klinger v.
Dir., Dep’t of Revenue, 455 F.3d 888, 897 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that Title II did not validly abrogate state
sovereign immunity insofar as it related to claims that people with disabilities have been charged for handicap
parking placards), with Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 556 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that Title II’s abrogation
of sovereign immunity was valid insofar as it applies to public education), and Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d
24, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding the same as Bowers).
98
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discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”105 And in the
original ADA, Congress included a finding that
individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability
106
of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.

Although there is scant legislative history, this is loaded language. The
term “discrete and insular minority” was drawn directly from the Court’s
language in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,107 which is widely taken
to be the seminal statement articulating bases of the different standards of
equal protection review.108 This language may have been intended to express
Congress’s view that people with disabilities were entitled to some form of
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause or, at the very least,
draw attention to a history of segregation and discrimination.109
But when Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA),
this provision was removed.110 The rationale was that it was a poor fit with the
ADAAA’s goals of broadening the narrow ways that courts had interpreted the
105

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2006).
Id. § 12101(a)(7) (repealed 2008).
107 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“Nor need we enquire . . . whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.” (emphasis added)).
108 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 552. For a robust treatment of the Carolene footnote, see Bruce
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) and J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 275 (1989).
109 See Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 987 F. Supp. 451, 457 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (“By invoking the
language of suspect classification, the now-familiar mantra of ‘discrete and insular minorities’ from Footnote 4
of United States v. Carolene Prods., Congress may have been attempting to force the courts to treat the
disabled as a suspect class for equal protection purposes. . . . However, it seems more likely that Congress was
merely availing itself of its fact-finding powers and pointing out to the courts that the disabled have suffered
historically in this country.” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); see also NAT’L COUNCIL
ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 107 (2004), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2004/
Dec12004 (“The awkwardly worded finding was cobbled together from language of several different Supreme
Court decisions establishing criteria for constitutionally ‘suspect’ classifications for equal protection purposes.
It attempted to improve the chances that courts would subject discrimination on the basis of disability to
heightened judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. This congressional finding was intended to
assist plaintiffs with disabilities seeking to invoke heightened equal protection scrutiny in lawsuits filed after
the ADA took effect.”).
110 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3354–55.
106
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ADA’s definition of disability.111 This removal reflected tensions, which
existed prior to and continued through the ADA’s enactment, between using
political power for a core group of people with disabilities and expanding the
Act’s protections to secure maximum coverage for the most people.112 And in
cases like Garrett, the Supreme Court had already demonstrated that it would
pay no attention to this finding.113 But if nothing else, this removal served as
further evidence of the move away, by Congress and advocates that
participated in the passage of the ADAAA, from a constitutional vision for
even some categories of people with disabilities.
II. IS THERE A ROLE FOR DISABILITY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW?
Despite (and perhaps because of) constitutional setbacks, and as result of
fierce advocacy and legislative prowess, modern advocates for the disability
cause have a highly effective statutory scheme, which in many ways outpaces
that of other groups. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people
with disabilities in employment and provides that employers need to make
reasonable accommodations, at their own expense, to facilitate the inclusion of
people with disabilities in the workplace.114 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities in programs that
received federal financial assistance,115 and Title II of the ADA effectively
extended these provisions to all state and local government programs, services,
and activities.116 Title III of the ADA is an analogue to Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,117 requiring that privately owned places of public
accommodation not discriminate against people with disabilities, which
includes making reasonable modifications to facilities and practices when
doing so would not constitute an undue burden.118 The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act gives parents a broad range of procedural and
substantive rights with the goals of including students with disabilities in the
educational system and getting them appropriate services to facilitate this
111 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 109, at 108 (“The ‘discrete and insular minority’
language was not intended to be applied to the full scope of persons to whom the ADA provides protection
from discrimination. Obviously, people who are merely regarded as having a disability are not such a discrete
minority, because a mistaken perception of disability can happen to any American.”).
112 See BAGENSTOS, supra note 26, at 34–51.
113 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001).
114 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
115 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
116 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
117 Compare id. § 12182(a), with id. § 2000a.
118 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii).
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inclusion.119 The Fair Housing Act, as amended, requires that certain
residential dwellings be constructed and designed in an accessible manner.120
And the Help America Vote Act, amongst other things, requires that each
polling place have one polling machine that enables people with disabilities to
vote secretly and independently.121
These statutes go beyond what any heightened constitutional protection
could provide because they extend deep into the private employment and
accommodations spheres. Advocates have the challenging work of making
sure these civil rights protections are enforced and implemented, which, as I
have examined elsewhere, is a monumental task.122 And the historic
disinclination of public enforcement officials to take the lead in many areas of
these laws both complicates this task and makes it more pressing.123 This being
the case, and given the disinclination of the current Supreme Court to expand
heightened equal protection status to any new groups, is any discussion of
disability constitutional law really worth having?
In this Part, I suggest why disability constitutional law should be part of the
strategy to advance the rights of people with disabilities. This position has both
a pragmatic and normative basis. Accepting and working within the
constitutional framework established by Cleburne ultimately carries costs in
the political and legislative arena. The ADA has already been challenged as
exceeding its constitutional bases,124 and such attacks will continue and
intensify. Not gaining constitutional ground is tantamount to losing it,125 and
will ultimately undermine the success of any legislative strategy. And there are
areas where Cleburne still operates to disadvantage categories of people with
disabilities—particularly those with mental disabilities—in their interactions
with the state. This happens in areas like family law, commitment proceedings,
the provision of state benefits and licensing, and voting, amongst others.
119

See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(i)–(iii).
121 See id. §§ 15421(b)(1), 15481(a)(3).
122 See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434 (2007).
123 See id. at 436, 451, 457, 460.
124 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S 356 (2001) (challenging the constitutionality of
Title I of the ADA); see also Sarah E. Sutor & Susan Elizabeth Grant Hamilton, Constitutional Status of the
ADA: An Examination of Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Concerning the 11th Amendment, 19 REV. LITIG. 485, 486–97 (2000).
125 See Doug NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877,
893 (2013) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD (2011)) (“Social movement work on movement–countermovement struggles demonstrates the need for
movement activists to meet their adversaries on all relevant battlegrounds.”).
120
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Reviewing recent constitutional litigation in both state and federal courts
demonstrates that the more contextualized vision of equal protection, which
some hoped Cleburne might stand for, is beginning to appear, just not for
people with disabilities. More normatively, progressive theorizing about the
Constitution is already happening, and the disability cause is diminished by not
being a part of this conversation. Framing rights in constitutional ways carries
a certain permanence and gravitas, and engages courts differently in the
process of constitutional culture than bringing claims that a particular statutory
right has been infringed.
A. Doctrinally, Cleburne Still Matters
Cleburne still casts a large shadow.126 States still have laws that are facially
discriminatory against people with disabilities, usually on the basis of mental
disability. These exist in areas like family law, voting, commitment
proceedings, and the provision of benefits. Within family law, some states
require consideration of mental disability in determinations of parental fitness
or otherwise link mental disability to a termination of parental rights.127 For
example, California has a statute that authorizes the superior court to set aside
a decree of adoption within five years of its entry where the adopted child
manifests a developmental disability or mental illness as a result of conditions
that existed prior to the adoption and of which the adoptive parents had neither
knowledge nor notice.128 A different California statute requires reunification
services for parents and children but denies them to mentally disabled
parents.129 Similar statutes exist in other states.130 States also restrict the right

126

See Laura C. Bornstein, Contextualizing Cleburne, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 91, 118 (2010)
(“[A]lthough Cleburne was a nominal victory for the operators and inhabitants of group homes, its legacy is
one of anemic constitutional and statutory protections for the mentally retarded and other disabled individuals.
In this legal landscape, government-sanctioned prejudice against mentally retarded persons has endured.”).
127 See Dale Margolin, No Chance to Prove Themselves: The Rights of Mentally Disabled Parents Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Law, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 112, 154–169 (2007).
128 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9100 (West 2013).
129 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2013).
130 For example, Nevada’s statute on termination of parental rights provides that
In determining neglect or unfitness by a parent, the court shall consider, without limitation,
the following conditions which may diminish suitability of a parent:
1. Emotional illness, mental illness or mental deficiency of the parent which renders the
parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and continuing physical or psychological
needs of the child for extended periods of time.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.106(1) (West 2013). For other examples, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7827
(authorizing the state to terminate the parental rights of an individual based in part on the individual’s mental,
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of people with mental disabilities to get married. For example, Tennessee law
provides that “[n]o [marriage] license shall be issued when it appears that the
applicants or either of them is at the time drunk, insane or an imbecile.”131
Kentucky law provides that “[a]ny person who aids or abets the marriage of
any person who has been adjudged mentally disabled, or attempts to marry, or
aids or abets any attempted marriage with any such person shall be guilty of
a . . . misdemeanor.”132 Based on laws like this, parents with disabilities face
state proceedings to remove children from their care.133 The National Council
on Disability recently issued a report, Rocking the Cradle: Ensuring the Rights
of Parents with Disabilities and Their Children, concluding that “[c]learly, the
legal system is not protecting the rights of parents with disabilities and their
children.”134

not physical illness); GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(ii), (B)(i) (2012); and MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15103(3)(e)(i) (2012).
131 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-109 (2010).
132 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.990(2) (West 2006). The federal government itself has a marriage penalty
for people with disabilities. The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program provides cash benefits to
eligible individuals with disabilities who fall below a federal means test. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2006). To
qualify, an adult with a disability must meet the Social Security definition of disability, including an inability
to do any substantial gainful activity. Id. § 423(d)(1)–(2). If two people receiving SSI get married, they will
receive 25% less in benefits than they did as individuals, and one or both of them may also lose eligibility for
Medicaid. See RICHARD BALKUS & SUSAN WILSCHKE, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ISSUE PAPER NO. 2003-01,
TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES IN THE SSI PROGRAM 1 (2003), available at
www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/issuepapers/ip2003-10.pdf. This creates difficult choices for people with disabilities
(albeit choices that SSI recipients in other categories, including the poor and elderly, face as well). See B.J.
Stasio, People with Disabilities and the Federal Marriage Penalties, IMPACT, Spring/Summer 2010, at 26, 26
(“People with disabilities want to get married. We fall in love and want to make a commitment to the person
that we love and become a family. For many it is a religious choice to get married. Yet, too many people with
disabilities must choose between getting married and continuing to receive the benefits they need to live from
federal programs . . . .”).
133 For example, Erika Johnson and Blake Sinnett had their baby, Mikaela, removed from their custody by
the State because they were blind. Tom Henderson, Blind Couple Reunited with Baby Taken Away by State,
PARENTDISH (July 23, 2010, 5:09 PM), http://www.parentdish.com/2010/07/23/blind-couple-reunited-withbaby-taken-away-by-state/; Bonnie Rochman, Why Parents with Disabilities Are Losing Custody of Their
Kids, TIME (Nov. 27, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/11/27/why-parents-with-disabilities-are-losingcustody-of-their-kids/. They were only reunited fifty-seven days later. Henderson, supra; Rochman, supra.
134 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH
DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 14 (2012), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2012/Sep272012/
(“[P]arents [with disabilities] are the only distinct communities of Americans who must struggle to retain
custody of their children. Removal rates where parents have a psychiatric disability have been found to be as
high as 70 to 80 percent; where the parent has an intellectual disability, 40 percent to 80 percent. In families
where the parental disability is physical, 13 percent have reported discriminatory treatment in custody cases.
Parents who are deaf or blind report extremely high rates of child removal and loss of parental rights. Parents
with disabilities are more likely to lose custody of their children after divorce, have more difficulty in
accessing reproductive health care, and face significant barriers to adopting children.”).
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Some of these statutes have been challenged under the federal Equal
Protection Clause. In most instances, courts cite Cleburne for the proposition
that people with disabilities are not a protected class, and exercise almost
unlimited deference to the state’s purported justifications as rational. For
example, in Adoption of Kay C., plaintiffs challenged California’s statute
authorizing a court to set aside an adoption for a child with an undisclosed
mental disability.135 After noting that people with disabilities were not entitled
to heightened scrutiny under Cleburne, California offered the justification of
promoting the state’s interest in adoption.136 In response to the plaintiff’s
argument that there was no evidence the statute actually functioned to this end,
in upholding the statute the court reasoned,
We need not state our opinion on the matter, because “most
fundamentally, the constitutionality of a measure under the equal
protection clause does not depend on a court’s assessment of the
empirical success or failure of the measure’s provisions. . . .
‘Whether in fact the Act will promote [the legislative objectives] is
not the question: the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied by our
conclusion that the [state] Legislature could rationally have decided
137
that [it] . . . might [do so].’”

Other cases follow a similar course.138 In no instance is there any
application of the type of “rational basis with teeth” analysis as evidenced in
Cleburne. Simply stated, Cleburne provides no help in these cases: “[N]o court
to date has struck down on the basis of irrationality any child custody or child
welfare law alleged to discriminate against parents with disabilities.”139 But
135

278 Cal. Rptr. 907, 909 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 914–16.
137 Id. at 915 (alterations in the second sentence in original) (quoting Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cmty.
Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 679 (Cal. 1984)).
138 In In re Christina A., 216 Cal. Rptr. 903, 905 (Ct. App. 1989), a parent challenged section 361.5 of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code, requiring reunification services for parents and children but denying
them to mentally disabled parents. Applying rational basis, the court held the statute did not violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection, stating “[i]t is reasonable for the state, before expending its
limited resources for reunification services, to distinguish between those who would benefit from such services
and those who would not. One of those classes of parents [who would not benefit] is those with a sufficient
degree of mental disability . . . .” Id. at 907.
Similarly, in In re Eugene W., 105 Cal. Rptr. 736, 738–39, 741 (Ct. App. 1972), the court rejected an
equal protection challenge to the then existing California law, CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (codified as amended at
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7827 (West 2013)), authorizing the state to terminate the parental rights of an individual
based in part on the individual’s mental, not physical, illness. The court stated that “[t]he distinction between
physical and mental illness . . . is amply warranted” by “reason of the differing nature of the two disabilities”
and the effect it would have on one’s ability to parent. In re Eugene W., 105 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
139 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 134, at 301.
136
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these laws would appear not at all related to the objective of promoting child
welfare, as the social science research suggests “there is no evidence that child
maltreatment is more prevalent among parents with disabilities.”140
Commitment proceedings are also examples of state statutory schemes that
facially discriminate against people with mental disabilities. For example, In re
Harhut considered a Minnesota statute allowing for indefinite commitment of
persons with mental retardation.141 Individuals who were substance abusers
were not subject to a similar indefinite commitment under the statute.142 Citing
Cleburne, the court held that
[T]he distinction between commitment periods [between mental
disability and substance abuse] is based on the legislative judgment
that mental retardation is, unlike chemical dependency or mental
illness, a condition not usually susceptible of great or rapid
improvement. The legislature decided that indeterminate commitment
subject to judicial review on the motion of the patient was the more
effective and efficient way to deal with the state’s responsibility to
treat mentally retarded persons. This is a legitimate public purpose,
and it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that indeterminate
commitment is an unreasonable means of assuring the state’s
143
interest.

This application of Cleburne undertakes no meaningful review of the propriety
of these legislative determinations.
There are other state laws that have expressly discriminated on the basis of
disability in the provision of state benefits or licenses. For example, from 1995
to 1997, Hawaii’s General Assistance Statute limited the duration of benefits to
one year for people with disabilities who were unable to provide sufficient
support for themselves; benefits to persons with dependent children had no

140 Id. (citing Kate Judge, Serving Children, Siblings, and Spouses: Understanding the Needs of Other
Family Members, in HELPING FAMILIES COPE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 161, 161–83 (Harriet P. Lefley & Monay
Wasow eds., 1994), and Carol G. Taylor et al., Diagnosed Intellectual Impairment Among Parents Who
Seriously Mistreat Their Children: Prevalence, Type and Outcome in a Court Sample, 15 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 389, 395 (1991)).
141 385 N.W.2d 305, 306 (Minn. 1986).
142 See id. at 311.
143 Id. Similarly, in Georgia, once an individual with mental retardation is involuntarily committed to an
institution, he or she may never have the opportunity to be heard in court again. See GA. CODE ANN. § 37-4-42
(2012); see also Laura W. Harper, Comment, Involuntary Commitment of People with Mental Retardation:
Ensuring All of Georgia’s Citizens Receive Adequate Procedural Due Process, 58 MERCER L. REV. 711, 718,
726 (2007).
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time limitation.144 When challenged, this law was held not to violate Title II of
the ADA, because the court reasoned that Hawaii’s general assistance scheme
was not required to provide equal categories of benefits to all of the citizens it
deemed needy.145 In considering the plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause
challenge, the court cited Cleburne for the proposition that people with
disabilities do not constitute a suspect class.146 Hawaii’s justification—the
“preservation of . . . fiscal integrity . . . while providing benefits to the greatest
number and the most needy”—was legitimate and rationally related to its
actions.147
Many state-based professional licensing processes ask questions that screen
for disability in different ways.148 In Guttman v. Khalsa, a physician with a
history of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder had his license
suspended by the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners.149 In evaluating
his claim for damages under Title II of the ADA, without extensive analysis,
the court cited Cleburne for the proposition that the action was rational.150
Similarly, state bar organizations routinely ask questions and deny bar
admissions based on a history of treatment for mental disability.151
Voting is another area where laws expressly disenfranchise individuals
with mental disabilities.152 Kentucky’s constitution provides that “idiots and
insane persons” shall not have the right to vote.153 Iowa has a constitutional
provision that “[a] person adjudged mentally incompetent to vote or a person
144 Does 1–5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing the disparity in the 1995
law); see Act of June 16, 1997, act 200, sec. 7, § 346-71(b), 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 379, 385 (codified as
amended HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-71 (West 2008)) (eliminating the maximum duration of benefits for disabled
recipients).
145 Chandler, 83 F.3d at 1155–56.
146 Id. at 1155.
147 Id. at 1556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 For example, in Medical Board of California v. Hason, “[t]he Medical Board of California denied Dr.
Michael J. Hason a medical license because of his history of depression. A graduate of Yale College and New
York Medical College, Dr. Hason received a medical license in New York and worked successfully as a
physician at [hospitals in New York, Connecticut, and even California].” Brief of Respondent at 1–2, Med. Bd.
of Cal. v. Hason, 538 U.S. 958 (2003) (No. 02-479), 2003 WL 1090215, at *1–2 (footnote omitted).
149 669 F.3d 1101, 1106–07 (10th Cir. 2012).
150 Id. at 1116.
151 See, e.g., Stephanie Denzel, Second-Class Licensure: The Use of Conditional Admission Programs for
Bar Applicants with Mental Health and Substance Abuse Histories, 43 CONN. L. REV. 889, 892–93 (2011);
Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, The Last Taboo: Breaking Law Students with Mental Illnesses and Disabilities out of the
Stigma Straitjacket, 79 UMKC L. REV. 123, 124 (2010).
152 See Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of
Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 940 (2007).
153 KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3.
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convicted of any infamous crime shall not be entitled to the privilege of an
elector.”154 Here, there have been some successful constitutional challenges,
though not because of any judicial inquiry into legislative classifications or a
record of discrimination on the basis of disability.155 In Doe v. Rowe, there was
a challenge to the Maine Constitution, which stated that all persons were
eligible to vote except “those under guardianship by reason of mental
illness.”156 Because of the fundamental nature of the right to vote, the court
applied strict scrutiny.157 Thus framed, the court struck down the constitutional
provision, reasoning that
Maine’s voting restriction may very well have constituted equal
treatment when it was passed in 1965. Nonetheless, this historical
perspective does not guide the Court’s inquiry. Rather, present day
understandings of equal treatment must guide the Court’s scrutiny of
158
the voter eligibility lines drawn by the State of Maine.

The court held that the term “mental illness” was too broad to meet the state’s
compelling interest in ensuring that voters have the mental capacity to make
their own decisions by being able to understand the nature and effect of the
voting act itself.159 Following similar reasoning, a recent decision by a
Minnesota state court struck the part of the state’s constitution that denied the
vote to “a person under guardianship, or a person who is insane or not mentally
competent.”160
This is where the federalism cases, discussed above, become especially
relevant. Through the Court’s new federalism jurisprudence, Cleburne has also
limited the ability of Congress to pass remedial legislation predicated on a
damage remedy against states.161 The constitutionality of the ADA is part of a

154 IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5. For examples of similar language in other state constitutions, see KY. CONST.
§ 145, cl. 3; MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241; NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 6; N.M.
CONST. art. VII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6.
155 As discussed below, there is potential for disability rights advocates, as in other movements, to
combine Equal Protection and Due Process Clause protections to secure some form of heightened scrutiny. See
infra Part III.B.
156 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 46 (D. Me. 2001).
157 Id. at 51.
158 Id. (citation omitted).
159 Id. at 52–54.
160 In re Guardianship of Erickson, No. 27-GC-PR-09-57, slip op. at 6, 26 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012)
(italics removed) (quoting MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1).
161 E.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360, 366 (2001) (citing City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)) (holding that suits to recover monetary damages from
states for failing to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
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larger struggle going on in the federal courts about Congress’s ability to
legislate pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.162 While there may not be an organized “anti–disability rights”
movement with a primary agenda of limiting Congress’s ability to legislate to
protect the rights of people with disabilities,163 in cases involving damages
challenging a state’s classification of people with disabilities, state actors
typically challenge the ADA’s constitutionality.164 And because of Cleburne,
the ADA remains uniquely vulnerable to these attacks. In an environment
where government enforcement officials and public interest organizations have
limited resources, restrictions on a damage remedy create a powerful incentive
for underenforcement of key guarantees of the statute.165
To be sure, many of the barriers encountered by people with disabilities
exist in employment and in accessing privately owned places of public
accommodations, areas for which the ADA is a far better tool than
constitutional law. And even in the interaction of people with disabilities with
the state, many of the current challenges faced by people with disabilities
involve states not meeting the needs of people with disabilities (usually
through resource allocations), not outright exclusions.166 Barriers to accessing
polling places167 and the current iteration of the deinstitutionalization
movement168 are examples of these types of challenges. Although there may be
a role for constitutional law in these campaigns, these are not challenges to
facially discriminatory laws.169 Under Washington v. Davis, these types of
162

See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text.
Cf. Shauna Fisher, It Takes (at Least) Two to Tango: Fighting with Words in the Conflict over SameSex Marriage, in QUEER MOBILIZATION: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW 207, 218–24 (Scott Barclay et
al. eds., 2009) (analyzing the impact of movement-countermovement dynamics surrounding marriage for
same-sex couples).
164 E.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362.
165 See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The
Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1092, 1119
(2007) (surveying two hundred public interest organizations and concluding that the greatest negative impact
of Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532
U.S. 598 (2001), is on class actions seeking relief against government actors); see also Pamela S. Karlan,
Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 207–08.
166 See Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People with Disabilities, 14
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 353, 364 (2003).
167 Id. at 355–56.
168 See generally Bagenstos, supra note 34.
169 For example, a recent case challenged the inaccessibility of New York’s polling places for people with
physical disabilities. See United Spinal Ass’n v. Bd. of Elections, 882 F. Supp. 2d 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Plaintiff claimed that the defendant Board of Elections had a responsibility to administer elections, which it
had not discharged, in a way that was consistent with Title II of the ADA’s requirement that people with
163
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disparate impact challenges are largely foreclosed under existing conceptions
of constitutional law, especially when there are benign purposes that could be
offered for many of these laws and resource allocation decisions.170 Yet even
with these limitations, there are still facially discriminatory laws, which can
and should be candidates for constitutional challenges.
B. A Progressive Vision of Disability Rights Framed in Constitutional Terms
Disability rights advocates, like other cause lawyers, are pursuing change
through multiple forms of advocacy, utilizing an array of tools. These include
political mobilization, communication through the media, public education,
legislative reform, and enforcement efforts.171 Understandably, pursuing
constitutional claims is not high on the agenda of leading disability rights
advocates.172 There is a premium on expending valuable movement resources
on strategies that have the most immediate chance of success. People with
disabilities need employment opportunities and access to health care just as
much, if not more, than abstract pronouncements of constitutional rights. And
because the ADA was passed pursuant to Congress’s constitutional powers,
pursuing justice under it is one (indirect) form of articulating a constitutional
vision of the rights of people with disabilities.
disabilities be able to access polling places to exercise their right to vote. Id. at 616–17. There was no state
statute that formally disenfranchised people with disabilities; rather, it was the implementation of the Board’s
existing duty under state law that created the cause of action. See id. at 623. By way of disclosure, the author
was an expert witness for the plaintiffs in this case. Similarly, in Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson, 653 F.
Supp. 2d 184, 314 (E.D.N.Y 2009), vacated sub nom. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. N.Y. Coal. for Quality
Assisted Living, Inc., 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), the court found that that New York State officials and
agencies discriminated against thousands of people with mental illness by administering the state’s mental
health service system in a manner that segregates them in large, institutional adult homes and denies them the
opportunity to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. Again, there was no
formal statute drawing classifications on the basis of disability; rather, it was the implementation of the state’s
overall scheme for administering to this population that was at issue. See id. at 187–88. On appeal, the court of
appeals ultimately vacated the district court’s decision for lack of jurisdiction. Disability Advocates, Inc., 675
F.3d at 152.
170 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“But our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”).
171 See Waterstone et al., supra note 8, at 1323–27 (discussing different advocacy strategies as reported by
disability cause lawyers).
172 Id. at 1317 (“No lawyers we interviewed brought constitutional cases as a regular part of their practice.
A poll showed a near-uniform consensus among the lawyers that constitutional litigation was not a priority or
even a significant item on the litigation agenda.”); see also id. at 1317–18 (noting views of one lawyer that “I
would totally use the Constitution if it helped us. . . . [T]he Constitution is very weak on this, and so I’ve
thrown it in, but mostly it hasn’t been the lead for us because it’s weak on disability and [is even] used against
us on disability issues.” (alterations in original)).

WATERSTONE GALLEYSPROOFS

556

1/31/2014 12:41 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:527

I am not suggesting that making advances under constitutional law should
be the only, or even the primary, goal of the disability rights movement.
Commentators, and even some disability cause lawyers, sensibly express
trepidation about the use of courts to advance movement goals.173 Myopically
pursuing constitutional change to create real reform on the ground is an
incomplete and dangerous strategy for any group and can lead to a “hollow
hope.”174 But the disability community does not find itself put to that choice: it
has a highly evolved advocacy movement, which has grassroots support and is
effective at, and across, multiple levels of government.175 Using courts for the
selected claiming of constitutional rights should be part of that effort.176
Pursuing constitutional change is not the complete answer to this open space,
but over the long term, it should not be neglected as part of the effort.
Legislative lawyering should not be the only tool; statutory claims are
fundamentally different from constitutional ones.177 Claims brought under the
ADA often turn on technical issues of statutory interpretation: which
individuals are covered under the ADA’s definition of disability,178 where the
line between reasonable and unreasonable accommodations lies,179 and what

173 See WEST, supra note 23, at 218–19; see also Waterstone et al., supra note 8, at 1318 n.151 (noting
views of one lawyer that “I don’t see how you can do constitutional litigation in the disability area until you
have judges whose perception[s] of disability move[] away from the sympathy narrative to the rights
narrative.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Another lawyer noted that the level of
scrutiny is reflective of the fact that “people don’t think about disability rights on the same level as racial
discrimination or race-based civil rights.” Id.
174 See ROSENBERG, supra note 24. In a thoughtful recent article, Professor Samuel Bagenstos discusses,
within the disability context, how the constitutional theories and advocacy of the deinstitutionalization
movement were better at moving people out of institutions than providing them appropriate care when they
were in the community, a task for which other forms of advocacy are better suited. See Bagenstos, supra note
34, at 6, 11–12.
175 See Waterstone et al., supra note 8, at 1323–27.
176 See NeJaime, supra note 125, at 879 (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 125, and suggesting that “by
decentering courts in his analysis and instead looking to social movement contestation happening both in and
out of court, Balkin advises us to be skeptical of the claims animating the turn away from courts”).
177 See Brief of the American Ass’n on Mental Retardation et al. in Support of Respondents at 19, Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008437, at *19 (“For people with disabilities,
constitutional protection against discrimination by governmental actors remains crucial even in light of . . .
legislative developments, because the scope of the statutory protections is incomplete.”).
178 See, e.g., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566–67 (1999) (holding that an individual
with amblyopia, an uncorrectable eye condition, was not covered by ADA’s definition of disability); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999) (holding that twin sisters with myopia were not covered by
ADA’s definition of disability).
179 See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002) (holding that exception to seniority
policy was not a reasonable accommodation).
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exactly an employer must offer to prove defenses under the Act.180 Even in
claims against state and local governments under Title II of the ADA, courts
rarely need to discuss the role of history of discrimination or stigma against the
disability classification in anything except the most cursory terms. This
engages courts in a different way than the Fourteenth Amendment, which by
definition goes more to the heart of a group’s claim for full citizenship under
our nation’s governing charter. It is the Constitution that is our “basic law”
(setting a framework of governance), our “higher law” (setting the values to
which the country aspires), and “‘our law’—an object of attachment that
Americans see as the product of their collective efforts as a people.”181 There is
something important—some would say redemptive—about using the
Constitution to try to achieve a more progressive vision of society.182 And the
current posture of disability constitutional law does not adequately
acknowledge the depth of historical prejudice against people with disabilities
(mental disabilities in particular) and how a faithful vision of the Equal
Protection Clause would recognize that state classifications grow out of that
mindset.183 There is also a practical dimension to this: despite fluctuations in
the Court’s constitutional doctrines, constitutional law generally has a
permanence and gravitas that statutory law does not.184
It is axiomatic that the social movement of people with disabilities, and the
lawyers who both serve and lead that movement, are a crucial part of how
180

See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542–43 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
plaintiff must first make facial showing of proportionality of accommodation to costs and then defendant must
show undue burden).
181 BALKIN, supra note 125
182 Id. at 118.
183 See Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105
n.72 (1982) (defining discrete and insular minorities as those “groups that are not embraced within the bond of
community kinship but are held at arm’s length by the group or groups that possess dominant political and
economic power”). This construction can and should apply to people with disabilities, especially mental
disabilities, in the United States and in the greater world community. See, e.g., GERARD QUINN & THERESIA
DEGENER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY: THE CURRENT USE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISABILITY, at 15, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/02/1, U.N. Sales
No. E.02.XIV.6 (2002) (“[P]eople with disabilities were often virtually invisible citizens of many societies.
They have been marginalized in nearly all cultures throughout history.”); Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and
Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV. 997, 1027 (2004) (“Deviating from [social norms] (as with a discredited
condition like a disability) often leads to isolation, impaired status and social condemnation.”).
184 See Brief of the American Ass’n on Mental Retardation et al. in Support of Respondents, supra note
177, at 19–20 (“The equal protection doctrine that applies to people with disabilities is also important because,
unlike racial and gender civil rights laws, the statutory protections for people with disabilities remain
controversial and vulnerable to attack in the political arena.”); see also, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 4839–40 (1995)
(statement of Rep. Philip M. Crane) (arguing for amending the ADA to reduce its impact on professional
sports).
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disability law continually unfolds.185 By pursuing justice through popular
movements and legislative reform, advocates are certainly helping the
American people with their obligation “to flesh out and implement the
Constitution’s guarantees in their own time.”186 By going to the legislature,
advocates have played to their strengths.187 And this type of broad mobilization
is essential to any type of constitutional progress.188 Yet, by abandoning
constitutional claiming, advocates have allowed the pendulum to swing too far
in the nonconstitutional direction. At present, disability advocates are creating
an articulation of constitutional values without the Constitution, which is an
incomplete mission. One harmful legacy of this acceptance of the limited
application in Cleburne is that constitutional rights claiming and the trope of
constitutional dialogue regarding disability have been completely stilted.189
Courts and constitutional law are both part of, and responsive to, culture.190
But without having a disability constitutional law agenda there is no dialogue
occurring, and courts cannot and will not have this conversation in a vacuum.
And this is a key moment to begin. Below, I discuss why there are fertile
doctrinal grounds to make selected gains. But, as laws like the ADA have
increased society’s acceptance⎯although incompletely⎯of people with

185 See NeJaime, supra note 125, at 877 (reviewing Balkin’s Constitutional Redemption and noting that
“[Balkin] exposes the feedback loop between social movements and courts: courts respond to claims and
visions crafted by movements, and court decisions in turn shape the claims and visions of those movements
and alter the political terrain on which those movements operate”).
186 See Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 11, 11 (Jack M.
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (noting that this is done through “building political institutions, through
passing legislation, and through creating precedents, both judicial and nonjudicial”).
187 See Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
2020, supra note 186, at 79, 79 (“[P]rogressive lawyers should take this opportunity of their respite from
judicial power and attend to the development of that [legislative] Constitution . . . .”).
188 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020,
supra note 186, at 25, 31 (“Academic theories of legal justification do not mobilize public opinion; they do not
inspire popular political campaigns to ‘take back the Court.’ Academic arguments may ultimately help
transmute practical aspirations and grievances into legal form, but constitutional mobilization begins far
outside the domain of jurisprudence.”).
189 In explaining the extension of Boerne to Garrett, Robert Post characterizes the ADA as a statute of
“low political salience.” Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 & n.102 (2003). While the nation has the
“conviction that an essential mission of the federal government is the prevention of racial and gender
discrimination,” id. at 23, the same cannot be said of disability.
190 See id. at 8 (“[T]he Court in fact commonly constructs constitutional law in the context of an ongoing
dialogue with culture, so that culture is inevitably (and properly) incorporated into the warp and woof of
constitutional law.”); see also NeJaime, supra note 125, at 878 (“Legal scholars have increasingly focused on
the role of social movements to understand both the way in which constitutional meaning is constructed and
the role of courts in that process of construction.”).
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disability and sensitivity to their needs,191 an opportunity should be taken to
include this cultural shift in constitutional doctrine and values, and to push the
“membrane separating constitutional law from constitutional culture.”192 The
movements to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual
orientation have made similar jumps.193 And progressive theorizing about the
Constitution is already happening, just not with any vision of disability
constitutional law at the table.194 And while this is a longer-term project, it
should not be considered futile to believe that some universe of people with
disabilities should find greater protection in a progressive vision of the
Constitution: Justices Marshall195 and Blackmun196 indicated acceptance for a
heightened review of some state action on the basis of disability; in his Garrett
dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens)
demonstrated an amenability to a more nuanced consideration of the
constitutional dimension of state discrimination on the basis of disability;197
and several state supreme courts have shown a willingness to raise the standard
of review for certain disability considerations.198
This progressive vision of disability rights, framed in constitutional terms,
should happen under state constitutions as well. In other movements, state
constitutions have served as important vehicles to express evolving notions of
equality, even in the face of rigid federal doctrine.199 The gay rights movement
191 The return from war of soldiers with disabilities has led to an important coalition that has increased
social acceptance of those with disabilities. See David A. Gerber, Heroes and Misfits: The Troubled Social
Reintegration of Disabled Veterans in The Best Years of Our Lives, in DISABLED VETERANS IN HISTORY 70,
73–75 (David A. Gerber ed., 2000) (describing the postwar response to the needs of injured veterans). See
generally Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081 (2010)
(discussing the impact of veterans returning on disability law).
192 Post, supra note 189, at 9.
193 See BALKIN, supra note 125, at 70 (“When social movement contestation succeeds in delegitimatizing
a practice sufficiently, it also usually succeeds in getting courts to ratify that conclusion through their
interpretations of the Constitution.”); see also infra Part III.
194 The vanguard of this movement, the anthology THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 186, and its
larger project, THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, http://www.constitution2020.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2014), does
not currently include any specific discussion of disability.
195 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 456 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
196 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 334–35 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing for heightened
scrutiny for laws that “discriminate against individuals with mental retardation”).
197 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 376–77 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198 See infra Part III.
199 See Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings,
30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 873–74 (1999) (“[R]ecent legal and political developments at the state levels, including
recent efforts by Congress to ‘devolve’ social programs, give new relevance to this legal and judicial activity.
State supreme court efforts to restructure educational finance, to confront racial and economic segregation in
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made a conscious turn to focus on state-level actors in the face of the loss
before the Supreme Court in Bowers.200 Recognizing that “state courts [are]
important parts of a national dialogue about American constitutional
principles,”201 advocates engaged in a deliberate campaign to challenge state
sodomy and discriminatory marriage laws. Apart from changing laws in these
states, this effort helped pave the way to the Court’s overruling of Bowers in
Lawrence v. Texas.202 Justice Kennedy acknowledged this in Lawrence when
he noted the evolution of state sodomy law.203 As discussed below, there have
been some limited challenges to laws that discriminate on the basis of
disability under state constitutions, a development that I argue should be noted
and extended. But there has been no coherent strategy in this context. And
academic commentary on state disability law has been focused on securing a
broader definition of “disability” under state antidiscrimination law,204 a
problem which had vexed disability advocates until the passage of the
ADAAA. But this is still a legislation-centered view of even state court
litigation.
This is unfortunate, as state constitutions are a particularly fertile ground
for expressing constitutional values. As Douglas Reed argues, “The differing
institutional contexts of state constitutions and their far greater popular
dimensions mean that the higher law tradition of the U.S. Constitution is less
central to the state court experience.”205 Across campaigns for different
movements, state court constitutional theories can gain acceptance where they

education and housing, and—most prominently—to allow marriage between same-sex couples all point to a
continuation or expansion of the dynamics of the ‘new judicial federalism.’” (footnotes omitted)); see also
Kenji Yoshino, The Paradox of Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the Supreme Court, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 527, 539 (“Even when a group is recognized [under equal protection law], the courts will be loath to
move too quickly if not enough state laws have moved in its favor.”).
200 See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 989 (2011).
201 Id. at 990 n.234 (citing JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE
OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 20 (2005)).
202 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see NeJaime, supra note 200, at 992.
203 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (“In our own constitutional system the deficiencies in Bowers became even
more apparent in the years following its announcement. The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant
conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against
homosexual conduct.”).
204 See generally Sande Buhai, In the Meantime: State Protection of Disability Civil Rights, 37 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1065 (2004) (advocating the use of state laws to protect the disabled from discrimination and provide
effective workplace remedies to them).
205 Reed, supra note 199, at 875. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States:
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986)
(discussing the reemergence of state constitutions, instead of the Fourteenth Amendment, as guarantors of
individual rights).

WATERSTONE GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

1/31/2014 12:41 PM

DISABILITY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

561

might not under the federal constitution.206 The pieces are in place, as
disability advocates exist in every state, and they are mobilized at multiple
levels of state and local government.207 Even given restrictive interpretations of
Cleburne at the state and federal levels, there is as of yet unfulfilled potential
to use movement capital on state constitutional politics.208 While advocates are
uniquely situated by having a formidable federal civil rights statute, they
should not neglect the potential of state constitutional litigation to help (over
time) create a more progressive vision of disability constitutional rights.
Politically, pursuing disability constitutional law will involve some
different and perhaps difficult choices for the disability rights movement.
Although there were some limited coalitions,209 people with disabilities have
traditionally been parts of discrete constituencies organized around separate
lived experiences, often advocating for separate goals.210 People in the deaf
community may not, at first blush, have much in common in advocacy goals
with people with mobility impairments.211 The modern disability rights

206 See Justin R. Long, Essay, Demosprudence, Interactive Federalism, and Twenty Years of Sheff v.
O’Neill, 42 CONN. L. REV. 585, 588 (2009) (noting that, in the education rights context, “state constitutional
jurisprudence can usefully function as a site of resistance to federal constitutional interpretations”); see also
Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 93, 97 (2000) (“[I]n acknowledging the value of dialogue, a state court not only honors the
authority of its institutional role within the federal scheme, it also engages the U.S. Supreme Court in
discourse about the interpretive possibilities inherent in [contested] constitutional provisions . . . .”).
207 The Protection and Advocacy System is a federally mandated network of organizations that exists to
protect and advance the interests of people with developmental disabilities and has a least one office in every
state. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041, 15043 (2006).
208 See Reed, supra note 199, at 886 (“The meanings of state constitutions often do not rest on judicial
interpretations, but on particular forms of political imagining: political mobilization and organization.”). But
see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 757 n.73 (2011) (acknowledging that
“[i]n some cases, state courts interpreting state constitutions have gone further in their grants of heightened
scrutiny than have federal courts interpreting the United States Constitution,” but observing that “the slack
created by the federal equal protection jurisprudence has not been fully picked up by the states’ equal
protection jurisprudence”).
209 See PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 32–101
(2003) (detailing vignettes of earlier disability rights activities and arguing for a comprehensive disability
rights legal history).
210 See, e.g., GARY L. ALBRECHT, THE DISABILITY BUSINESS: REHABILITATION IN AMERICA 281 (1992)
(“These diverse groups, while sharing common interests, do not constitute a united lobby. Rather, they seek
their own objectives, often competing with one another for resources.”); SHARON BARNARTT & RICHARD
SCOTCH, DISABILITY PROTESTS: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 1970–1999, at 109–38 (2001) (discussing unity and
disunity within the disability rights movement and noting differences between lived experiences and political
goals).
211 But see Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class
Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 901 (2006) (introducing the concept of “pandisability,” recognizing that
eradication of “group-based stigma and subordination” begins with group-based litigation).
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movement, generally thought of as starting in the 1970s, attempted to unite
these different groups.212 The common frame was one of independence,
described as “the ability of people with disabilities to make their own choices
concerning how to live their lives, what services to receive, and how and where
to receive them.”213 Apart from appealing to a broad coalition of people with
disabilities, this was a useful political frame, aligning with American ideals of
independence and self-reliance.214 This ideology (and political power) was
reflected in the passage of the ADA, which takes an empowering civil rights
and antidiscrimination approach, seeking to remove barriers that keep people
with disabilities from being full participants in national life.215
Most federal court litigation has focused on the ADA’s definition of
disability, and the driving impetus of the ADAAA was to “restore” an
expanded construction of that definition.216 But any realistic assessment of
disability constitutional rights needs to acknowledge that not everyone covered
by the ADA would or should align with heightened constitutional analysis.217
Rather than pursuing heightened status for a broad category of “people with
disabilities,” a progressive vision of disability constitutional law should unfold
as it has in other contexts: responding to discriminatory state statutes that
themselves define the class of people that they impact. As discussed above,
states still have statutes that are facially discriminatory against individuals with
mental and developmental disabilities.

212 See BAGENSTOS, supra note 26, at 30 (“When the modern American disability rights movement began
in the early 1970s, movement leaders believed that a significant part of their task was to forge a collective
identity of ‘people with disabilities’ from that disparate collection of impairment-specific identities.”).
213 Id. at 25.
214 Id. at 31.
215 The ADA opens with congressional findings that “physical and mental disabilities in no way diminish
a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, yet many people with physical or mental
disabilities have been precluded from doing so because of discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(1) (Supp. V
2011).
216 See BLANCK ET AL., supra note 30, at 70–71.
217 As amended by the ADAAA, the ADA’s definition has been interpreted to include individuals with
diabetes, see Berard v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., No. 8:10-cv-2221-T-26MAP, 2011 WL 4632062, at *1–2
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2011) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment), sleep apnea, see Johnson v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., No. CIV-11-963-C, 2012 WL 95387, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 2012) (denying
defendant’s motion for summary judgment ), and a chronic ankle injury causing difficulties walking, see Fleck
v. Wilmac Corp., Civil Action No. 10-05562, 2012 WL 1033472, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2012) (denying
defendant’s motion for summary judgment ), as well as other conditions. This is not to suggest that these
decisions were wrongly decided, or that a broader construction of the ADA’s definition of disability is
undesirable. Rather, it is essential to carrying out the statute’s remedial purpose, and a reflection of the fact
that widespread discrimination against individuals with broad types of disabilities still exists. But the ADA
definition of disability need not correlate perfectly with heightened constitutional analysis.
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The ADA has been a transformative statute, opening up opportunities in
public and private life for people with disabilities. And the gains it has helped
secure for people with mental disabilities in employment, independent living,
and other areas should not be trivialized. But the unfortunate reality is that the
omnibus civil rights approach has not worked as well for people with mental
disabilities, who still remain the most stigmatized population of people with
disabilities.218 Even with the ADA, people with mental disabilities still remain
vulnerable to thoughtless and outdated state statutes precluding their
independence. The unifying frame has its utility, but it has been misused in
constitutional law: the analysis of people with mental retardation in Cleburne
was extended to all people with disabilities in Garrett without any discussion
or analysis. A return to fragmentation of strategies is not costless—it dilutes
political power by taking away from a big-tent approach. But it is practically
and doctrinally worthwhile. Below I turn to what opportunities exist under
federal and state constitutional law to chart a different course forward on
disability constitutional law.
III. THE EXAMPLE OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND THE PATH FORWARD FOR
DISABILITY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: MOVING BEYOND A SIMPLISTIC VIEW OF
CLEBURNE
For disability law purposes, Cleburne has been the end-all–be-all statement
of the constitutional rights of people with disabilities. And, despite the holding
in Cleburne itself, which provided constitutional protection to people with
mental disabilities, it has been nearly uniformly applied to deny people with
disabilities any protection under the Equal Protection Clause. Advocates for
other groups (most recently, those arguing for marriage equality) have

218

See, e.g., Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 587
(2003) (“[P]eople with mental disabilities are more feared, more stigmatized, discriminated against more often,
and are seen as more likely to commit acts of violence than are people with physical disabilities.”); see also
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 6 (1999)
(noting that, although for people with physical disabilities the most common form of discrimination is
paternalism, in the case of mental disability, “[discrimination] is manifested by bias, distrust, stereotyping,
fear, embarrassment, anger, and/or avoidance”). Courts have recognized this. See, e.g., Breen v. Carlsbad Mun.
Sch., 120 P.3d 413, 422 (N.M. 2005) (“[P]ersons with mental illness are often the poor stepchild, and remain
the last hidden minority.” (quoting Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can
Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 20 (1993–1994)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). The
ability of policymakers to target people with mental disabilities was unfortunately again on display in the
aftermath of the recent tragedy in Newtown, Connecticut. See Wayne LaPierre, Statement at NRA Press
Conference 3 (Dec. 21, 2012), http://home.nra.org/pdf/Transcript_PDF.pdf (criticizing lack of a national
registry for the mentally ill).
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mobilized more effectively and done more with Cleburne and the Equal
Protection Clause in both federal and state courts. Their campaigns offer
important lessons for disability advocates.
A. Litigation Under the Federal Constitution—Rehabilitating Cleburne
In Cleburne, Justice Marshall suggested that the Court was not faithfully
applying rational basis scrutiny and, in striking down the statute, was actually
elevating the standard of review without being willing to acknowledge doing
so.219 As part of this argument, he noted that U.S. Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno220 and Zobel v. Williams,221 which the majority cited as supporting its
application of rational basis, “must be and generally have been viewed as
intermediate review decisions masquerading in rational-basis language.”222
Moreno invalidated Congress’s decision to exclude from the food stamp
program households containing unrelated individuals on the basis that it
represented “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group.”223 This holding in Moreno was cited in Romer v. Evans, a challenge to
amendment 2 to Colorado’s constitution, which prohibited all legislative,
executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from
discrimination.224 Citing Moreno, the Court struck down amendment 2 as
violating the Equal Protection Clause, failing rational basis scrutiny.225 Romer
was influential in Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court held that Texas’s
sodomy law was unconstitutional.226
This more nuanced vision of the Equal Protection Clause, as set forth in
Moreno and developed in Cleburne, Romer, and Lawrence, provided part of
the ideological foundation for the federal constitutional strategy of challenging
219 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 459–60 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
220 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
221 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
222 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 459 n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1090 n.10 (1978)).
223 413 U.S. at 534. Zobel struck down an Alaskan dividend distribution program, holding that the only
apparent justification for the plan’s retrospective aspect was to favor established residents over new residents,
which was constitutionally unacceptable. 457 U.S. at 65.
224 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24, 634–35 (1996).
225 Id. at 634–35. A number of disability rights organizations filed an amicus brief in Romer
deemphasizing the formal three tiers of review and arguing that, under Cleburne, laws that discriminate on the
basis of archaic and false stereotypes should not withstand Equal Protection Clause review (a category that
they believed properly included people with disabilities and homosexuals). Brief of the American Ass’n on
Mental Retardation et al. in Support of Respondents, supra note 177, at 4, 17.
226 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–76 (2003) (discussing Romer).
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the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Built on earlier state and federal
constitutional advocacy, a series of recent cases challenged section 3 of
DOMA, which denies same-sex couples lawfully married under state law the
federal marriage-based benefits that are available to similarly-situated
heterosexual couples.227 In Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, the First Circuit held that section 3 of DOMA violated equal
protection principles.228 The court first “declined to create a major new
category of ‘suspect classification’ for statutes distinguishing based on sexual
preference,” both out of a sense of judicial modesty and because of binding
First Circuit (and arguably Supreme Court) precedent.229 Yet the court
continued that “[w]ithout relying on suspect classifications, Supreme Court
equal protection decisions have both intensified scrutiny of purported
justifications where minorities are subject to discrepant treatment and have
limited the permissible justifications.”230 The court then considered three
cases—Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer—where “the Supreme Court . . . struck
down state or local enactments without invoking any suspect classification. In
each, the protesting group was historically disadvantaged or unpopular, and the
statutory justification seemed thin, unsupported or impermissible.”231
The court noted that these decisions “did not adopt some new category of
suspect classification or employ rational basis review in its minimalist form;
instead, the Court rested on the case-specific nature of the discrepant treatment,
the burden imposed, and the infirmities of the justifications offered.”232 What
tied these cases together was “historic patterns of disadvantage suffered by the
group adversely affected by the statute.”233 Having thus framed that, in this
more contextualized fashion, it would evaluate the burdens and justifications,
the court found the burdens comparable with those in Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer.234 On the legislative justification, the court accepted the stated

227 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
228 682 F.3d 1, 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2884, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887, and
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013).
229 Id. at 9.
230 Id. at 10.
231 Id. The court also considered the extent to which Supreme Court precedent related to federalism-based
challenges to federal laws reinforced the need for some form of heightened scrutiny. Id. at 7–8. But it does not
appear that the court’s Equal Protection Clause holding rested on that analysis.
232 Id. at 10.
233 Id. at 11.
234 Id.
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rationale of preserving scarce government resources.235 Yet, unlike in
“traditional” rational basis,236 the court did not take this as an end to the
inquiry; instead, the court reasoned that this undermines, rather than bolsters,
the distinction of historically disadvantaged groups237 because these groups
have historically been less able to protect themselves in the political process.238
After expressing similar skepticism of the other legislative justifications
(supporting child-rearing and moral disapproval of homosexuality), the court
was clear that it was not relying on hostility to homosexuality.239 The court
went on to hold section 3 unconstitutional under the equal protection principles
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.240
Similarly, in Dragovich v. U.S. Department of the Treasury,241 the court
noted that “rational basis review is not ‘toothless.’”242 The court went through
the justifications for section 3 of DOMA and found them unsupported and
unconvincing.243 And in Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management,244
the court reasoned that “no federal appellate court ha[d] meaningfully
examined the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to gay men and
lesbians.”245 Endeavoring to do so, the court held that heightened scrutiny
should apply.246 The court reasoned that there was a history of discrimination
against gay men and lesbians;247 that sexual orientation has no relevance to a
person’s ability to contribute to society;248 that sexual orientation is recognized
as a defining and immutable characteristic because it is so fundamental to
one’s identity;249 and that, despite some political gains, gay men and lesbians
continue to suffer discrimination “unlikely to be rectified by legislative

235

Id. at 9.
Id. (noting that under traditional rational basis, cost justifications would defeat plaintiff’s case).
237 Id. at 14 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)).
238 Id. (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.14; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
239 Id. at 16 (“In reaching our judgment, we do not rely upon the charge that DOMA’s hidden but
dominant purpose was hostility to homosexuality.”).
240 Id. at 15, 17.
241 872 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
242 Id. at 954 (citing Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)).
243 Id. at 962–63.
244 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 724 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir.
2013).
245 Id. at 985.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 985–86.
248 Id. at 986.
249 Id. at 986–87.
236
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means.”250 The court also held, in the alternative, that section 3 of DOMA
would be unconstitutional under rational basis scrutiny for similar reasons set
forth in Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Golinski, and Dragovich.251
In Windsor v. United States,252 while referencing Cleburne for the
proposition that courts are reluctant to create new suspect classes,253 the district
court distinguished between economic legislation that “normally pass[es]
constitutional muster [under rational basis review], and ‘law[s that]
exhibit[] . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group,’ which receive ‘a
more searching form of rational basis review . . . .’”254 For this latter category
of cases, like Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, the court cites Cleburne, Romer, and Moreno (as well as Lawrence v.
Texas).255 The court concluded that “[i]t is difficult to ignore this pattern,
which suggests that rational basis analysis can vary by context.”256 The court
then engaged in a similar analysis to Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services in evaluating legislative justifications. It was
similarly skeptical of the “conserving the public fisc” rationale, noting that
“[a]n interest in conserving the public fisc alone, however, ‘can hardly justify
the classification used in allocating those resources.’ After all, excluding any
‘arbitrarily chosen group of individuals from a government program’ conserves
government resources.”257 The Second Circuit affirmed,258 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.259

250 Id. at 989 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
251 See id. at 999–1002.
252 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013).
253 Id. at 401 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441).
254 Id. at 402 (all but first alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–80 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
255 See id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 406 (citation omitted) (quoting first Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982), and second
Dragovich v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).
258 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
259 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). The Supreme Court also granted certiorari in
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), a challenge to California’s proposition 8, requiring that a lawful
marriage be between a man and a woman, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). The Court held that the proponents
did not have standing to appeal the district court’s order declaring the proposition unconstitutional. Id. at 2668.
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The Supreme Court, per Justice Kennedy, first held that it had jurisdiction
and that the United States had standing.260The Court then held that section 3 of
DOMA was unconstitutional,261 although it did not explicitly adopt the
reasoning of any of the lower court opinions. The Court first went through the
history of states passing marriage equality statutes,262 and noted the traditional
power and authority of states over marriage.263 It then cast DOMA as rejecting
“the long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of
marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State.”264 But rather
than base its decision on federalism principles, the Court was clear it was not
doing so: “[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state
power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal
balance.”265
Rather, the Court provided this background because it framed DOMA as a
law intentionally disrupting certain marriages, where in contrast the state had
“used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this
way . . . [to] enhance[] the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in
their own community.”266 By imposing restrictions and disabilities on a class
that the state had chosen to protect, Congress’s action with DOMA was
analogous to Colorado’s action in Romer, which the Court cited, noting that
“[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful
consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional
provision.”267 In making this determination, the Court discussed the
importance of the right to marry,268 the harm DOMA does to the families of
same-sex couples,269 and Congress’s discriminatory purpose in enacting the

260

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2886–88 (2013).
See id. at 2696.
262 Id. at 2689–90.
263 Id. at 2691–92.
264 Id. at 2692.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
268 Id. (“The States’ interest in defining and regulating the marital relation . . . is more than a routine
classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits. . . . By its recognition of the validity of same-sex
marriages performed in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex marriages,
New York sought to give further protection and dignity to that bond. . . . This status is a far-reaching legal
acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between two people . . . .”).
269 Id. at 2694–95.
261
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legislation.270 Ultimately, the Court struck DOMA down as denying “the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment”271 and
noted this liberty “contains within it the prohibition against denying to any
person the equal protection of the laws.”272
The ink is barely dry on the Windsor decision, and much is still unknown
about how it will be interpreted in lower courts. Although specifically
declining to rule on the constitutionality of state laws that reject same-sex
marriage, Justice Kennedy’s ruling, noting that New York’s law “reflects both
the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the
institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of
equality,”273 in the early analysis has given marriage equality advocates hope
for the future.274 Perhaps intentionally, Windsor defies easy and conventional
constitutional analysis. In a strong dissent challenging many aspects of the
majority opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the constitutional rationale as
“rootless and shifting.”275 He chastised the majority for giving contradictory
signals as to whether it was relying on the Equal Protection Clause or
something coming closer to substantive due process under the Fifth
Amendment.276 And if indeed it was equal protection, Justice Scalia would
have upheld the law under rational basis scrutiny.277 Certainly post-Windsor,
claims under Cleburne to extend heightened scrutiny generally to
classifications on the basis of disability appear less promising.
In that way, the Court’s opinion validates and tracks the analysis of
Professor Kenji Yoshino, who, noting that the Supreme Court last accorded
heightened scrutiny to a classification in 1977, opines that “with respect to
federal equal protection clause jurisprudence, this canon has closed.”278
Yoshino does not advocate a move away from constitutional change generally;
rather, he criticizes the formal distinction between equality claims under the
270 Id. at 2694 (“DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make
them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like government
efficiency.”).
271 Id. at 2695.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 2692–93.
274 See, e.g., Linda Hirshman, The Gay-Marriage Victory Is Bigger than You Think: How the DOMA
Ruling Creates a Path for Nationwide Marriage Equality, NEW REPUBLIC (June 26, 2013), http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/113643/supreme-court-defense-marriage-decision-its-bigger-you-think.
275 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276 Id. at 2705–06.
277 Id. at 2706–07.
278 See Yoshino, supra note 208, at 757.
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Equal Protection Clause and liberty claims made under the Due Process Clause
or other guarantees, and demonstrates how the Court has moved away from
abiding by this distinction.279
What does this mean for disability advocates? The application of Windsor
to disability rights cases is inexact but, I would suggest, promising. In striking
down section 3 of DOMA, the Court considered the nature of the right
(marriage), the severe impact on same-sex couples and their families, and the
intentional nature of the law. This inquiry tracks lower court decisions, flowing
from equal protection precedents (which often themselves cite Cleburne)
examining the “case-specific nature of the discrepant treatment, the burden
imposed, and the infirmities of the justifications offered.”280 With facially
discriminatory laws, there is explicit disparate treatment. Many of the rights
involved (including parental rights and voting) have independent Due Process
protection281 and are thus amenable to a Yoshino-style dignity-type analysis.
There are certainly potential severe burdens⎯under these laws, people with
mental disabilities can be prohibited from marrying, voting, and receiving
certain government benefits. The DOMA cases are less deferential to the
“public fisc” rationale than in traditional rational basis, or at least rational basis
as typically applied in ADA cases where this concern, even without more,
carries the day.282 The DOMA cases also, in one form or another, reference
Moreno’s principle that a “bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group” is not a legitimate state interest.283 Indeed, this idea was part
of Cleburne itself, where, after rejecting heightened scrutiny, the Court
reasoned that “[t]he State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to
an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
irrational. Furthermore, some objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group,’—are not legitimate state interests.”284

279

Id. at 749.
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2884, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887, and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013).
281 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 802–11 (discussing parental rights); id. at 872–73
(discussing voting rights).
282 See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9, 16; Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
283 E.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
284 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
280
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There is not an exact parallel between laws like DOMA, explicitly enacted
to prevent gays and lesbians from having their marriages recognized, and laws
that seek to regulate the behavior of people with disabilities, where states will
offer the justification that they are trying to protect people with disabilities or
protect the general welfare from people with disabilities. But it is unclear why
legislation based on stereotypical and outdated assumptions about ability
should not be characterized as, for purposes of a contextualized equal
protection analysis, just as problematic as a legislative desire to harm.285
Legislators defending DOMA or state marriage laws offer rationales why
certain rights should not be conferred to gays and lesbians, based on their
understandings of what is desirable public policy, which runs through views on
ways that gays and lesbians interact with the world.286 The same could be said
about disability: laws that restrict access to government benefits, voting, or
community living on the basis of disability are based on legislative
understandings of how people with various disabilities interact with the world.
The labels of “desire to harm” and “paternalism” are in the eye of the beholder.
All movements are different, and to the extent any gains for the LGBT
community have been realized in this line of cases, they are built on advocacy

285 See Brief of the American Ass’n on Mental Retardation et al. in Support of Respondents, supra note
177, at 16, 1995 WL 17008437, at *16 (arguing that “[d]ifferent groups in contemporary society encounter
invidious discrimination in different ways, and [the] Court must be sensitive to these differences in
ascertaining whether legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause”); see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F. Supp. 2d 921, 1002–03 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding proposition 8 unconstitutional and detailing the extent to
which it was based on stereotypes about same-sex couples), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
286 E.g., 159 CONG. REC. H4168 (daily ed. June 28, 2013) (statement of Rep. Michele Bachmann)
(arguing that courts recognizing same-sex marriages “denie[s] equal protection rights to every American by
taking away our ability to elect our representatives, [to] have them give voice to what our opinion is”); id. at
H4165 (statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert) (arguing that once marriage is extended to same-sex couples it will
be impossible to justify outlawing bigamy and polygamy); 150 CONG. REC. 15,065–66 (2004) (statement of
Sen. Jim Bunning) (“Only a man and a woman have the ability to create children. . . . Traditional marriage has
been central to the understanding of family in Western culture from the very beginning, and the central reason
for marriage has been for the rearing of children.”); Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York
Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A1 (“‘God,
not Albany, has settled the definition of marriage, a long time ago,’ [Sen. Ruben] Diaz [Sr.] said.”); Baird
Helgeson, Gay Marriage Clears Crucial House Hurdle, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 10, 2013, at 1A
(“Rep. Glenn Gruenhagen, R-Glencoe, said he fears that schools eventually will be forced to teach students
about homosexuality in sex education classes, normalizing what he considers deviant behavior. ‘Think about
what’s best for the children,’ Gruenhagen said. ‘Please vote for the children.’ Rep. Kelby Woodard, R-Belle
Plaine, said the measure stigmatizes Minnesotans who oppose same-sex marriage. ‘We are classifying half of
Minnesotans as bigots in this bill—and they are not,’ he said. Rep. Tony Cornish, R-Vernon Center, said he
was raised by a mother and a father and continues to believe that is best for children. ‘I am not a homophobe or
a Neanderthal or a hater,’ he said.”).
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across multiple fronts.287 And even under a more contextualized analysis, it is
entirely likely that courts may choose (perhaps even correctly) to uphold some
line drawing on the basis of disability.288 But this strategy represents the best
chance to incrementally expand the meaning of Cleburne and correct its most
egregious errors in refusing to acknowledge the history of discrimination
against people with disabilities, in particular mental disabilities. Current
disability cases offer no expression of the “case-specific nature of the
discrepant treatment, the burden imposed, and the infirmities of the
justifications offered”289 or the “historic patterns of disadvantage suffered by
the group adversely affected by the statute”290 as reflected in the DOMA cases.
If federal courts are willing to entertain a more nuanced vision of the equal
protection status of people with disabilities, it could also mitigate the harmful
effects of federalism decisions like Garrett, expanding the opportunities for
Congress to legislate on behalf of people with disabilities.
That this is a long-term project with uncertain prospects of success should
not counsel away from its pursuit. No movement pursuing its view of

287 For example, in the LGBT context, during the pendency of the DOMA cases, the Department of
Justice announced that, in its view, classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to a
heightened standard of scrutiny. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
February/11-ag-223.html. Although the full historical account of how this change in policy developed is
unclear, it certainly was based on advocacy by lawyers and activists both inside and outside the government.
See Douglas NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 691–98 (2012).
288 Kolton v. County of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 2002), is an imperfect example of this point.
There, a public employer limited long-term disability benefits for disability due to mental illness. Id. at 403.
The plaintiff brought a challenge under the state and federal constitutional equal protection clauses. Id. at 411.
The court acknowledged that there were potentially two forms of rational basis scrutiny that could apply, the
federal (more deferential) version, and the “Minnesota” articulation, where

(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded
must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby
providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and
needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there
must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the
prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately
attempt to achieve.
Id. (quoting State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991)). The court maintained that it did not matter
which version was applied—because the statute passed constitutional muster either way—and engaged in a
close review (including expert proof) of the employer’s justifications for the policy. Id. at 412.
289 Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 2884, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2877, and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013).
290 Id. at 11.
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constitutional justice proceeds unimpeded, and progress takes time.291 And the
reality is that the immediate risks are low, because, as discussed above, the
constitutional starting place is fairly bleak. Cleburne, as applied, offers nothing
positive for people with disabilities.
B. Litigation Under State Constitutions—Challenging Cleburne
It is unlikely that Cleburne, holding that people with disabilities are only
entitled to rational basis review, will be overturned any time soon in federal
court. In recognition of this, the analysis thus far has focused on securing more
favorable interpretations of Cleburne in federal court. But state constitutional
law offers additional opportunities to argue for heightened scrutiny in a way
that is not likely possible under the federal constitution. Again, LGBT
advocates have proven particularly adept at showing what is possible under
state law. They have used Cleburne to help secure heightened scrutiny for
marriage laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health, a case challenging Connecticut’s marriage
laws,292 demonstrates this. The Supreme Court of Connecticut expressly
recognized that it had greater latitude than would be possible under the federal
Equal Protection Clause:
[T]he [state] constitution was not intended to be a static document
incapable of coping with changing times. It was meant to be, and is, a
living document with current effectiveness. . . . The Connecticut
constitution is an instrument of progress, it is intended to stand for a
great length of time and should not be interpreted too narrowly or too
literally so that it fails to have contemporary effectiveness for all of
293
our citizens.

The Connecticut court was clear that unlike Supreme Court Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence, which it characterized as putting dispositive
weight on only two factors (history of invidious discrimination and whether the
characteristics that distinguish the groups’ members bear no relation to their
ability to perform or contribute to society), it would consider the additional two
factors that, while cited, appear to not be that relevant to the Supreme Court’s
291 See NeJaime, supra note 125, at 901 (“[S]ome LGBT gains were met with backlash and setbacks, but
that is the constitutional and political system in which we live. A longer view suggests that constitutional and
social change is always a process of push and pull, of intense conflict and contestation. . . . Judicial decisions
are significant points along the way to constitutional and social change, but they are only points.”).
292 957 A.2d 407, 411 (Conn. 2008).
293 Id. at 421 (all but first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 19 (1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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analysis (immutability and political powerlessness).294 It expressly cited Justice
Marshall’s dissent and concurrence in Cleburne as the guiding principle for
how it would interpret its equal protection clause, focusing on the social and
cultural isolation of the excluded group.295 Framing the issue that way, the
court found that gays and lesbians had a history of invidious discrimination,
their defining characteristic did not relate to their ability to contribute to
society, their sexual orientation was central to their identity, and they met the
political powerlessness test because they could show a pervasive and sustained
nature of discrimination that could not necessarily be immediately or
permanently resolved through the political process.296 In the last factor, the
court viewed protective legislation as acknowledging, not marking the end of a
history of, purposeful discrimination.297
Many of the arguments that Kerrigan accepted and endorsed could be
applied to certain categories of people with disabilities.298 The most
challenging aspect is the second factor: many judges would no doubt reason
(as did the majority in Cleburne) that mental disability impacts a person’s
ability to contribute to society in a way that sexual orientation does not.299 But
294 Id. at 427 (“It is evident, moreover, that immutability and minority status or political powerlessness are
subsidiary to the first two primary factors . . . .”).
295 Id. at 429 n.22 (“Our application of the test for determining whether a group is entitled to heightened
protection under the state constitution, and, in particular, our consideration of the two subsidiary criteria of
immutability and status as a minority or politically powerless group, is informed by the following observations
of former United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall about that test in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Cleburne.” (citation omitted)).
296 Id. at 435, 438, 444, 461.
297 Id. at 450.
298 See, e.g., id. at 430 (citing Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools, 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 29, 138 N.M.
331, 120 P.3d 413, discussed below, which held that people with disabilities are entitled to heightened scrutiny
under the New Mexico equal protection clause).
299 A disability rights critique of this view, as originally articulated in Cleburne, would be that it is based
on a cramped understanding of human variability and ability to contribute to society. To be sure, people with
mental disabilities may occupy a different place in the spectrum of human ability. But to let this difference
completely determine policy, or constitutional doctrine, ignores the role of socially constructed barriers to
participation in society and full citizenship. See, e.g., Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 20 (“[C]ourts should be
sensitive to classes of people who are discriminated against not because of a characteristic that actually
prevents them from functioning in society, but because of external and artificial barriers created by societal
prejudice. The historical treatment of . . . persons with mental disabilities makes clear that courts should be
sensitive to classes of people who are discriminated against in this manner.”); MICHAEL OLIVER & BOB SAPEY,
SOCIAL WORK WITH DISABLED PEOPLE 29 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the social model of disability as “nothing
more or less fundamental than a switch away from focusing on the physical limitations of particular
individuals to the way the physical and social environments impose limitations on certain groups or categories
of people”); Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
809, 814 (1966) (“A disability is a condition of impairment, physical or mental, having an objective aspect that
can usually be described by a physician. . . . A handicap is the cumulative result of the obstacles which
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giving weight to all four factors deemphasizes the importance of that factor.
And as the social model of disability has made inroads on public consciousness
with laws like the ADA, our notions of the ability of people with disabilities to
contribute to society have evolved from Cleburne’s time.
Many states, when evaluating disability-based classifications under their
state constitutions, cite Cleburne to align their state constitutions with the
federal standards that only rational basis scrutiny applies.300 But some state
courts have been willing to move beyond Cleburne and hold that people with
disabilities are entitled to heightened scrutiny under their state’s equal
protection clause. These cases are small in number, which simultaneously
shows the promise of this litigation and the challenges of it. In Daly v.
DelPonte, the plaintiff challenged a decision of the Commission of Motor
Vehicles suspending his driver’s license and requiring periodic medical reports
as condition for reinstatement.301 The plaintiff argued that because this
decision was based on his disability (seizure disorder), it violated the
Connecticut constitution’s equal protection clause.302 The Connecticut
constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of
the law nor be subjected to segregation of discrimination in the exercise or
enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color,
ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability.”303
The court found that this constitutional provision compelled the application
of strict scrutiny, whereby a state action resulting in unequal treatment can

disability interposes between the individual and his maximum functional level.” (quoting KENNETH W.
HAMILTON, COUNSELING THE HANDICAPPED IN THE REHABILITATION PROCESS 17 (1950))); Jacobus tenBroek,
The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 859 (1966)
(“Architectural barriers . . . make it very difficult to project the physically handicapped into normal situations
of education, recreation, and employment.” (quoting AM. STANDARDS ASS’N, AMERICAN STANDARD
SPECIFICATIONS FOR MAKING BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES ACCESSIBLE TO, AND USABLE BY, THE PHYSICALLY
HANDICAPPED 3 (1961))).
300 See, e.g., In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn. 1986) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)) (“The legislature decided that indeterminate commitment subject to judicial
review on the motion of the patient was the more effective and efficient way to deal with the state’s
responsibility to treat mentally retarded persons. This is a legitimate public purpose, and it is not clear beyond
a reasonable doubt that indeterminate commitment is an unreasonable means of assuring the state’s interest.
We hold, therefore that [the statute in question] is not in violation of the equal protection clauses of the federal
and state constitutions.”).
301 624 A.2d 876, 877 (Conn. 1993).
302 Id. at 882.
303 CONN. CONST. art. XXI. For the history of this provision, see Robert I. Berdon, Connecticut Equal
Protection Clause: Requirement of Strict Scrutiny When Classifications Are Based upon Sex, Physical
Disability or Mental Disability, 64 CONN. B.J. 386 (1990).
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only survive constitutional scrutiny if it serves a compelling state interest and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.304 The plaintiff conceded that the
state’s interest in highway safety was a compelling state interest, but
challenged the classification as insufficiently tailored to meet this interest.305
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the decision had not been based on any
administrative inquiry into the prognosis for his having future seizure
episodes.306 The court agreed, holding that the decision was not narrowly
tailored because it did not directly address the plaintiff’s particular medical
condition and circumstances.307
At least one other plaintiff prevailed on a constitutional theory even where
the state constitution did not explicitly include people with disabilities in its
equal protection clause. In Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools, the plaintiffs
challenged classifications under the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act,
which granted compensation for life for total permanent disabilities and up to
700 weeks for permanent partial physical disabilities, yet capped compensation
for all primary mental disabilities at 100 weeks.308 The court of appeals
rejected their challenge, holding that the New Mexico constitution required
only rational basis scrutiny (which the classification passed), and that the ADA
only prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in comparison to
people without disabilities.309 In considering the equal protection challenge, the
New Mexico Supreme Court noted that “[w]hile we take guidance from the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the federal
courts’ interpretation of it, we will nonetheless interpret the New Mexico
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause independently when appropriate.”310 At
issue was whether intermediate scrutiny applied, which the court reasoned
would be appropriate where the legislation at issue “(1) restrict[s] the ability to
exercise an important right or (2) treat[s] the person or persons challenging the
constitutionality of the legislation differently because they belong to a sensitive
class.”311

304

Daly, 624 A.2d at 884.
Id.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 885.
308 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 1, 138 N.M. 331, 130 P.3d 413.
309 Id. ¶ 6.
310 Id. ¶ 14. The court went on to note that “[i]n analyzing equal protection guarantees, we have looked to
federal case law for the basic definitions for the three-tiered approach, but we have applied those definitions to
different groups and rights than the federal courts.” Id.
311 Id. ¶ 17.
305

WATERSTONE GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

1/31/2014 12:41 PM

DISABILITY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

577

The court held that people with mental disabilities were indeed a sensitive
class and intermediate scrutiny applied.312 In so holding, the court explicitly
departed from the customary Cleburne analysis in several important ways. It
took as its guiding principle the strict scrutiny justification of “a discrete group
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.”313 Analogizing from the Court’s treatment of women in Frontiero v.
Richardson,314 the court reasoned that it would “apply intermediate scrutiny
even though the darkest period of discrimination may have passed for a
historically maligned group.”315 The court also noted that “[i]ntermediate
scrutiny should still be applied to protect against more subtle forms of
unconstitutional discrimination created by unconscious or disguised
prejudice,” and “[t]hus, the courts should be sensitive to classes of people who
are discriminated against not because of a characteristic that actually prevents
them from functioning in society, but because of external and artificial barriers
created by societal prejudice.”316 Thus, the court analogized the treatment of
people with mental disabilities to that of women.
The court also drew from Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cleburne, where he
detailed a “‘grotesque’ history of discrimination against persons with mental
disabilities.”317 The court reasoned that laws like the ADA were recognition of
the pervasive historical discrimination against people with disabilities, of
which “persons with mental illness are often the poor stepchild, and remain the
last hidden minority.”318 The court acknowledged that protective laws of this
type demonstrated that people with mental disabilities were not completely
shut out of the political process, but explicitly stated that the relevant inquiry
was whether effective advocacy was hindered by the need to overcome the

312

Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 763 P.2d 1153, 1161 (N.M. 1988),
overruled by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998–NMSC–031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
314 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
315 Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 20.
316 Id.
317 Id. ¶ 22 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
318 Id. ¶ 24 (quoting Perlin, supra note 218, at 20) (internal quotation mark omitted).
313
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already deep-rooted prejudice against their integration in society.319 Thus, the
court held that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate.320
New Mexico argued that the governmental interest in treating workers with
mental disabilities differently was to protect the financial viability of workers’
compensation.321 New Mexico was particularly concerned about fraudulent
claims for mental disability, which the state viewed as harder to diagnose.322
While acknowledging financial solvency as a proper goal for legislation and an
important interest, the court rejected the argument that the differential
treatment was substantially related to this interest.323 Rather, the court reasoned
that there were other, less restrictive mechanisms to defend against fraudulent
claims, and that the stated purpose of the law was to provide compensation for
all injured workers.324 Thus, the court held that the differential treatment failed
intermediate scrutiny.325
Other cases, while not explicitly holding that people with disabilities are
entitled to heightened scrutiny under state constitutional equal protection
clauses, have indicated at least amenability to the argument. In People v.
Green, a juror was struck by a peremptory challenge solely because she was
hearing impaired.326 While holding that this violated the juror’s right to equal
protection under the state constitution because there was no rational basis for
the action,327 the court noted that “[d]isabled persons in general and hearing
impaired persons in particular may constitute a ‘suspect classification’ in view
of the protection afforded to them by New York Statutes.”328 And in Donley v.
Bracken, a case involving West Virginia’s tolling of medical malpractice
claims for legally incompetent persons,329 the West Virginia Supreme Court,
319 Id. ¶ 29 (“The gains in societal acceptance and political advocacy made by the disability rights
movement today could easily be reversed through discriminatory laws in the future. Just as classifications
based on gender continue to warrant a heightened scrutiny even though women have become much more
integrated into the political arena in recent decades, similar gains by persons with mental disabilities do not
obviate the need for heightened scrutiny to examine legislation that draws distinctions based on mental
disabilities.” (citation omitted)).
320 Id. ¶ 20.
321 Id. ¶ 33.
322 Id.
323 Id. ¶¶ 34, 44.
324 See id. ¶ 44.
325 Id. ¶ 50.
326 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (Westchester Cnty. Ct. 1990).
327 Id. at 133.
328 Id. at 132 (footnote omitted) (“If so classified, state action affecting them as a group would be subject
to an exacting degree of judicial scrutiny.”).
329 452 S.E.2d 699, 701–02 (W. Va. 1994).
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citing Justice Marshall’s dissent in Cleburne, noted in dicta that “[t]he nature
of the allegedly discriminated-against class, the mentally disabled, arguably
calls for some heightened level of scrutiny.”330
Both the licensing statute in Daly and the compensation law in Breen had
legitimate reasons behind them: public safety and concern for the public fisc,
respectively. Under a traditional rational basis standard, the inquiry would
have ended there. But the application of heightened scrutiny in each case was
able to ferret out legislative motives that were based in part on stereotypes,
generalization, or stigma. In Daly, the assumption was that all persons with
seizure disorders were potential unsafe drivers, a view the court saw as not
necessarily correct for all individuals. In Breen, basing overall benefits on the
fear of people faking mental disability was found to be unwarranted, at least
when there were other less restrictive ways of policing fraud. In each case, it
was the application of some version of heightened scrutiny that allowed the
uncovering of these bases for the legislation, and opened the door for other
options that could still protect legitimate legislative choices while not having
as much of an impact on the general community of people with disabilities.
This journey into legislative motive and impact was deemed warranted given
the historical patterns of discrimination and prejudice against people with
disabilities. Breen was particularly significant: using the language of
constitutional law, the court decoupled disability and reduced ability or
inability to contribute to society, noting that barriers to being a part of society
are socially created.331
This formula⎯elevated scrutiny based on historical segregation and
stigma, which leads to a deeper inquiry into legislative motive⎯could be
useful in other state cases to uncover legislation that disadvantages people with
disabilities in their interactions with the state, particularly where there might be
less restrictive alternatives. As discussed above, many such scenarios exist.332
Often, even in state court and under state constitutional theories, Cleburne is
applied in these cases to justify state decisions without even a basic inquiry
into any outdated assumptions that these statutes are based on. Not all of these

330

Id. at 706.
See Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 20, 138 N.M. 331, 130 P.3d 413 (referring to
people with disabilities as being “discriminated against not because of a characteristic that actually prevents
them from functioning in society but because of external and artificial barriers created by societal prejudice”).
332 See supra notes 141–43 (discussing commitment proceedings); see also supra notes 127–30
(discussing family rights); supra notes 131–32 (discussing marriage rights); supra notes 144–47 (discussing
state insurance and benefits programs); supra notes 152–60 (discussing voting rights).
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statutory schemes would be invalidated by heightened applications of state
equal protection clause scrutiny, but it would facilitate a deeper inquiry into
these legislative judgments.
CONCLUSION
Disability advocates have been uniquely successful in pursuing legislative
reform and using these statutes to improve the lives of people with disabilities.
And while any critique of their efforts must be tempered by these gains, the
current trajectory of disability rights advocacy has been to create a constitutional
vacuum for people with disabilities. This has let courts off too easy in evaluating
and considering the constitutional rights of people with disabilities. Justice
Marshall’s vision of a more contextualized application of the Equal Protection
Clause, as set forth in Cleburne, has developed and grown in other areas. In this
Article, I suggest that the time has come to carry the torch forward with regard to
disability. The marriage equality campaign offers important lessons and a
blueprint for the efforts of disability cause lawyers.
And it is needed. State statutes still expressly discriminate on the basis of
disability, often mental disability, in important areas like family law, commitment
proceedings, voting, and the provision of public services. Both practically and
normatively, federal statutory law is an incomplete tool to remedy these
injustices. Laws like the ADA have helped show that people with disabilities can
and should be full members of our society. Constitutional law should require
greater judicial consideration of state laws that are based on outmoded
perceptions, stigma, and prejudice. Cleburne itself, and our evolving notions of
constitutional justice and fairness, require no less.

